Global Peace | Annex 1 | Stop Weapons Industry
The exhaustive classification of the families of weapons to which the halt of lethal production applies.
Stop Weapons Industry
Revised October 26, 2026
Andreea Talpeanu, in collaboration with Grok, built by xAI
Annex 1 of 5 of the Global Peace Protocol
Excellencies, Dear Ambassadors, Dear Members of the Permanent Missions,
REVISED TEXT OF 26 OCTOBER 2026 — This communication replaces Annex 1 of 5 dated 23 September 2026, which itself replaced the communication of 22 September 2026. The substance of the pillar is unchanged. The revision of 26 October 2026 1 integrates, at their logical places, new chapters whose headings are set in italics — general definitions; legal and technical definitions of the non-conventional classes and types and their distinction from cyber operations; residual loopholes; social transition; State responsibility for leakage; verification and audit; security guarantees; relationship with other instruments; final clauses; continuity with Annex 2; and the economic pillar of this Annex, the RoboTech and Sustainable Economy Initiative. The archive is restructured into Classes, Types, Series and Objects. Smaller adjustments to the text of 23 September 2026 are explained in footnotes.
The revision of 23 September 2026 had supplied in full the archive of the major weapons to which the halt of lethal production applies: electromagnetic weapons; environmental-modification / geoengineering / meteorological weapons; psycho-sociological / cognitive weapons; neutron irradiation / enhanced radiation inside Type A (formerly family A); and implanted hybrid bio-electronic / neuro-digital devices when configured as weapons. None of these is folded into “cyber” by default.
I hope this message finds you well.
Note on method. The research for this annex was supported by an artificial-intelligence research assistant (Grok, developed by xAI), used as a working tool for the classification: that the classes and types of weapons be named, distinguished, and left open to later adjustment. This is not a political endorsement of any State, any alliance
1 The version of 23 September 2026 replaced that of 22 September 2026 by adding the full archive of weapon families. The present version keeps the content of that archive, restructures it into Classes, Types, Series and Objects (article 2.8), and adds the legal, verification, institutional and economic chapters.
or any government in office, nor an institutional endorsement by any company. Responsibility for the Protocol and its Annexes rests solely with its initiator.2
This communication is Annex 1 of 5. Each Annex addresses one of the five pillars of the Global Peace Protocol dated 30 July 2025. The five pillars — Monetary Recalculation, the Geopolitical Court, Interpol Reform, Stop Weapons Industry, and Sustainable Economy — operate in synergy; none stands above the others.
The Protocol was received by postal mail at the Permanent Missions of China (21 July 2026), France (22 July 2026), the United States (22 July 2026) and Ireland (10 August 2026). It has since been transmitted by electronic mail to all 193 UN Member State delegations, to the ministries of foreign affairs of a small number of countries not represented at the United Nations, and to NATO. The European Bank responded positively and indicated that the text would be taken into consideration. The BRICS Bank received the Protocol by postal service. The World Bank did not accept delivery: the parcel was returned after one year, and the electronic message could not be delivered for lack of a working address in the available contact list.
I. Precisions on the conditions for stopping warfare production
The Protocol stops new lethal production. It does not empty national defence.
Nothing in the Protocol requires any State to renounce a military alliance. Existing arsenals remain untouched. They are neither destroyed nor reconverted. Existing stocks of munitions likewise remain intact and are preserved as national defence reserves. Sites that store munitions are not demolished and are not reconverted. They are kept so that they may be reactivated if needed.
These storage sites are placed under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating surveillance by military missions of States that either have no military-industrial sites on their territory or that, under the Protocol, undertake to renounce weapons industry entirely. Foreign surveillance is exercised in international cooperation with Interpol missions drawn from different countries. The political and surveillance missions of different countries operate under strict random rotation: their assignment to each site is drawn at random and is defined anew for each new mandate following the re-election of the principal Interpol missions. No State designates the mission that supervises its
2 Adjustment relative to the version of 23 September 2026: the note of support is reformulated as a note on method, and the renewal of support at the close of the annex is removed, so that the document keeps a strictly institutional character.
own sites. All weapon stocks thus remain national reserves under national surveillance, 3 enhanced by foreign rotating missions.
Confidentiality and non-abuse of knowledge. Members of rotating missions are bound by strict confidentiality. Information obtained on the location, content, security or condition of a site may be used only for the purposes of this Annex. It may not be communicated to any government, including the government of the member’s own State, to any armed force, intelligence service or private person, nor used for any military, commercial or political advantage, during the mission or after it. Since every participating State is supervised under the same rule and at the same time, each has the same interest in that confidentiality. Breach is a material breach of the Protocol and engages the individual criminal responsibility of the person concerned and the responsibility of the State that benefits from it (section XIX). The detailed rules are set out in Annex 2 (Interpol Enhancement).4
Transitional note. Supplementary questions concerning this rotation — composition of missions, method of drawing, duration of assignment and incompatibilities — will be addressed in Annex 2 (Interpol Enhancement).
What stops, by the agreed and gradual phases already described in the Protocol, is the production of lethal systems — in every Class and Type listed in section III — and the production of the munitions those systems consume. Stopping production is not the same as destroying stocks. Depots stay. Lines of lethal manufacture close.
The audit provided in the Protocol concerns production facilities and supply chains, not existing arsenals, which remain at the free disposal of national strategy. The inventory of existing arsenals must nevertheless be declared and made transparent among all States that accept the Protocol. Stockpiles of munitions and heavy weapons must be protected: first, by national surveillance and by rotating foreign surveillance drawn from States that themselves hold no such industrial base; second, by the rotating direction of Interpol provided for in the Protocol; and third, by a permanent national interception
3 Addition relative to the version of 23 September 2026: surveillance of storage sites is now both national and foreign, in cooperation with Interpol missions from different countries assigned by strict random rotation, renewed with each new mandate of the principal Interpol missions.
4 Addition relative to the version of 23 September 2026: stocks are kept under national surveillance, which foreign rotating missions enhance but do not replace. The confidentiality clause answers the objection that rotating missions would learn the location and condition of national stocks: each State is supervised in the same way, and misuse of that knowledge is a material breach.
shield against missiles or other unauthorised dangerous sources within the security perimeter, or by any other defensive method falling solely within the competence of the ministry of defence of the State concerned.5
Closure of a production line does not mean demolition of every military installation. Barracks, command structures, training grounds and storage sites are not the object of the 98 per cent measure.
The working definition used throughout this Annex is the definition already given by the Protocol: a lethal arm is any technology designed to cause irreversible harm or death. That definition is not limited to firearms, explosives, missiles and nuclear weapons. Those four were examples. Until now, no common and exhaustive international list of lethal weapons has existed. The present revision establishes that list.6
II. General definitions and rules of interpretation
Article 2.1 — Lethal weapon. For the purposes of this Annex, “lethal weapon” means any device, system, substance, agent, signal, software-controlled platform or technique, and any munition or component specifically designed for it, that is designed, configured, tasked or modified to cause death or irreversible harm to persons, or the lasting destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. This restates the definition of the Protocol of 30 July 2025 and is not limited to the examples it gave.
Article 2.2 — Irreversible / remediable. 1. An effect is “remediable” only if, in the ordinary case and under independent verification, the person or object affected recovers its prior state within the forty-eight-hour standard of section VI, by medical care or by restoration, without lasting sequel. Any effect that is not shown to be remediable is presumed irreversible. The burden of proof lies on the State that produces or holds the system.
2. The classification of a certified means as remediable is determined by its design and its certified conditions of use. It is not altered by, and does not cover: (a) the abusive use of a non-lethal means, including its use in quantities, doses,
5 Addition relative to the version of 23 September 2026: the interception shield is no longer the only admissible protection; any other defensive method within the sole competence of the national ministry of defence is accepted.
6 Clarification relative to the version of 23 September 2026: the sentence “They were never an exhaustive list” is replaced by an affirmative statement. It means that no common and exhaustive international list of lethal weapons existed before this Annex.
durations or ranges exceeding those certified; (b) the abusive use of defensive batons by police or Interpol officers; or (c) exceptional accidents in which a non-lethal means used in accordance with its certification causes serious harm to a particularly vulnerable person taking an active part in a public conflict. Such cases are not authorised by this Annex. They engage the individual, disciplinary and criminal responsibility of the persons concerned and, where applicable, the responsibility of the State (section XIX); they require immediate medical assistance to the person affected; and, where they recur, they lead to review of the certification of the means concerned.7
Article 2.3 — Weapons industry. “Weapons industry” means every public, private or mixed activity of research and development beyond the declared theoretical stage, design, production, assembly, upgrade, life-extension that adds new lethal capability, testing, and the supply of specifically designed components, software, services or financing for lethal weapons, irrespective of the ministry, budget line, company form or territory in which it is carried out.
Article 2.4 — Configuration test (dual-use). An item, line or programme belongs to a Type of section III by its function, configuration and assigned mission, not by its name, its civilian registration or the ministry that funds it. Indicators include: military or security tasking; specifications exceeding any credible civilian requirement; classified funding; concealment; and integration with targeting or delivery systems.
Article 2.5 — Intent and effect test. A system falls within a Type of section III when either (a) it is designed or tasked for hostile effect (intent element), or (b) its foreseeable and documented effect is lethal or irreversible and it has been placed at the disposal of armed or security forces (effect element). Absence of proof of intent does not exclude the effect element.
Article 2.6 — Anti-circumvention. Sub-variants, successors, re-designations, modular sub-assemblies, production abroad through subsidiaries, licence transfers and production for export are covered as if carried out by the State itself. Splitting a weapon into components each below a threshold does not remove the whole from the Type.
Article 2.7 — Interpretation. This Annex is interpreted in good faith in accordance with articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), in the light of its object and purpose: the halt of lethal production without depriving any State of its
7 Addition relative to the version of 23 September 2026: abusive use, overdosing and exceptional accidents do not reclassify a certified non-lethal means; they are dealt with as responsibility of the person and of the State.
defence. Where two readings are possible, the reading that closes a production line prevails over the one that keeps it open.
Article 2.8 — Structure of the archive: Classes, Types, Series and Objects. 1. The archive of section III is organised in four levels. A Class groups weapons by their principal mode of effect. A Type is a category of weapons within a Class, designated by a letter from A to S; the letters run in the order of the Classes, from Class 1 to Class 9. 8 A Series is a defined sub-category of a Type, designated by the letter of the Type and a number (for example, K.3). An Object is any individually identifiable system, munition, component, software, line or programme belonging to a Series. 2. The halt of lethal production applies at every level. A measure adopted for a Class applies to all its Types; a measure adopted for a Type applies to all its Series and Objects. 3. The Object is the unit of declaration, inspection, sealing and conversion (section XX). Each Object is declared with its Class, Type and Series. 4. Where an Object belongs to more than one Type, each Type is engaged cumulatively. Class 9, Type S, is transversal: it records civilian lines configured to produce an Object of any other Type.
III. Exhaustive archive of the major classes of weapons
The halt of lethal production applies to every Class, Type, Series and Object below. The archive is organised by effect and by industrial line, not by marketing name or by the ministry that holds the budget. A system belongs to a Type by what it is built to do, not by the word printed on the crate. Where a platform is dual-use, the configuration and the assigned mission decide.
This archive does not teach construction. It classifies. Classification is what a protocol owes to those who must legislate.
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 1 — Weapons of | ||||
8 Correspondence with the letters of the version of 23 September 2026 and of the first draft of 26 October 2026, so that the lettering runs in the order of the Classes: A to H unchanged; former O (incendiary) becomes I; former I (directed energy) becomes J; former J (electromagnetic) becomes K; former K (acoustic) becomes L; former L (autonomous) becomes M; former M (space) becomes N; former N (environmental) becomes O; former Q (psycho-sociological) becomes P; former R (implanted) becomes Q; former S (enclosed chamber, active zone) becomes R; former P (dual-use lines) becomes S. The content of each Type is unchanged.
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 1, Type A: Nuclear and enhanced-radiation | Nuclear-capable strike systems, including neutron irradiation, enhanced-radiation systems and neutron warheads. New production halted. | Declared, kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No. The last symbolic run may not add warheads or offensive nuclear or neutron delivery. | Neutron weapons are not a slogan. They are radiation. They are Type A. See the reading of Class 1. |
| Class 1, Type B: Chemical weapons | Lethal and classic chemical weapons. Production halted. | Declared; kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions; not reconverted, except a narrow certified subset after independent verification. | No, except incapacitants whose effect is remediable, and only within the limits of the Chemical Weapons Convention. | Same logic as biological weapons. |
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 1, Type C: Biological and toxin weapons | Production, stockpiling for hostile use, and hidden development prohibited. | Incompatible with the Protocol. Not a reserve. | No. Never. | Prior written declaration before any practical research with bioweapon potential. |
| Class 1, Type D: Radiological weapons and area-contamination devices | Production halted. | Declared; kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions; not reconverted. | No. | Effects are not remediable in the sense of the Protocol. |
| Class 2 — Conventional kineticandincendiaryweapons | ||||
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 2, Type E: Conventional land systems and land munitions | Combat vehicles, artillery, mortars, MLRS, anti-tank systems, mines, cluster munitions, small arms and light weapons destined for combat, and industrial explosive fill. | Declared and kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No for lethal lines. Police replacement only via certified remediable tools. | Closure of lines, not demolition of barracks or depots. |
| Class 2, Type F: Air combat systems and aerial munitions | Combat aircraft, attack helicopters, strike UAVs, bombs, and air-to-ground and air-to-air lethal stores. | Declared and kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No. | Interceptors and sensors are treated separately (section V). |
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 2, Type G: Naval combat systems and naval munitions | Strike combatants configured for lethal sea or land attack, naval missiles, torpedoes, naval mines, and shipborne strike aviation. | Declared and kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No. | Coast-guard and rescue platforms are not the object of the 98 per cent measure. |
| Class 2, Type H: Missile, rocket and hypersonic strike systems | Ballistic, cruise, hypersonic glide and boost-glide, anti-ship, land-attack, and comparable offensive missiles and their industrial munitions. | Declared and kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No. | Missile-defence interceptors: last symbolic run (section V). |
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 2, Type I: Incendiary, thermobaric and fuel-air systems | Systems designed to kill or destroy by fire, overpressure or oxygen depletion in a populated or civil setting. | Declared and kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions, only if already held as conventional stock; no new production. | No. | Industrial demolition charges under civil licence are not this Type. |
| Class 3 — Energy, electromagnetic andacousticweapons | ||||
| Class 3, Type J: Directed-energy weapons of irreversible effect | Weaponised high-energy lasers and comparable beams designed to destroy persons, platforms or critical civil plant. | Declared if held; kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No, unless independently certified remediable and non-destructive. | Distinct from rangefinders and ordinary sensors. |
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 3, Type K: Electromagnetic weapons | Offensive electromagnetic pulse, high-power microwave, and hostile radio-frequency systems designed to disable or destroy persons, electronics, grids, or medical, energy and water systems. | Declared if held; kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No where the effect is not remediable. | Not absorbed into “cyber”. Own Type. See section XI. |
| Class 3, Type L: Acoustic and infrasonic weapons of irreversible effect | Systems designed to cause permanent injury or death by sound or pressure. | Declared if held; kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No. | Temporary, medically reversible acoustic tools may be examined for the two per cent. |
| Class 4 — Autonomyand space | ||||
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 4, Type M: Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) | Systems that select and apply lethal force without meaningful human control. | Declared if held; kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions; no new production. | No. | Autonomy in interception and detection remains subject to human authorisation . |
| Class 4, Type N: Space weapons and destructive counter-space systems | Kinetic anti-satellite interceptors, co-orbital destructive devices, debris-generating weapons, and nuclear or directed-energy weapons based in or transiting space for hostile use. | Declared if held; kept in national reserve under national surveillance, enhanced by foreign rotating missions. | No. | Space-situational-awareness sensors and non-destructive collision avoidance are not weapons. |
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 5 — Environmentalmodification, geoengineering, meteorological andtectonicweapons | ||||
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 5, Type O: Environmental, geoengineering, meteorological and tectonic weapons | Hostile weather; drought or heating used as a weapon; induced seismic or oceanic disturbance; hybrid explosive technologies linked with tectonic plates or faults (conventional, nuclear, or irradiation); other hybrid coupling to a plate boundary; any hostile environmental-modification technique. | Incompatible with a reserve. It is not kept as national defence stock. | No. Never. | ENMOD (adopted 1976, in force 1978) is the floor, not the ceiling. Own Type. See section XII. |
| Class 6 — Psycho-sociologicalandcognitiveweapons | ||||
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 6, Type P: Psycho-sociological weapons (psycho-hacking) | Systems designed to alter impulse, memory or the collective behaviour of a person, a population or a social class by neurochemical action, by electromagnetic action on neural activity, or by mass inductive information without a remediable off-switch. | Incompatible with a reserve where the effect is irreversible. Not stored “in case”. | No. Never, where the effect is not remediable under the forty-eight-hour standard. | Not a metaphor. Not absorbed into cyber, chemistry or marketing. Own Type. See section XIII. |
| Class 7 — Implantedhybrid bio-electronicand neuro-digitalweapons | ||||
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 7, Type Q: Implanted hybrid bio-electronic and neuro-digital weapons | Human-borne micro-devices — electronic, thermal-recharge, auditory, optical or other — configured to surveil, to coerce, to exfiltrate, or to serve as a bridge into a third-party system, including an implant reacted under neutron irradiation. | Incompatible with a reserve where the device is a weapon. | No, where the effect is not remediable. | Not a neutron. Not “only cyber”. Own Type. See section XIV. Medical implants remain medical until configured as weapons. |
| Class 8 — Enclosed-chamberprocesssystemsand theactive zone | ||||
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 8, Type R: Enclosed-chamber systems and the active zone | Chemostats and other enclosed-chamber chemical or biological process devices configured as a weapons line, and hostile command of an active zone — a house, a block, a neighbourhood or any delimited inhabited volume — to deliver, hold or lock an effect on those inside. | Incompatible with a reserve where the zone itself is the weapon. | No. Never, where the effect on inhabitants is not remediable. | Not “only chemistry”, and not “only a smart building”. Civilian chemostats remain civilian until tasked as weapons. |
| Class 9 — Dual-useindustriallinesconfiguredas weapons (transversal ) | ||||
| Class / Type | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Class 9, Type S: Dual-use industrial lines configured as weapons | A civilian line becomes a weapons line when it is organised, funded or tasked to produce a system in Types A–R. | Configuration, not the factory building, is the object of the halt. | Only if the output itself is remediable and certified. | Declaration rule of section XVIII applies. |
The nineteen Types, grouped in nine Classes, are the object of the 98 per cent measure wherever the output is lethal or non-remediable. Sub-variants, national designations and future names that perform the same function fall inside the same Type and are recorded as Series or Objects of it. Silence of a trade name in this Annex is not an exemption.
Schedule of Series. The following Series are recorded on the basis of the descriptions given in sections IV to XIV. The list is open (section XXV); further Series, and the Objects belonging to each, are declared under article 20.2.
- Type A: A.1 nuclear warheads and explosive devices; A.2 delivery systems built
to carry them; A.3 enhanced-radiation and neutron systems, including focalised irradiation means.
- Type B: B.1 lethal chemical agents; B.2 chemical munitions and their specifically
designed delivery means; B.3 incapacitating means proposed for certification (article 2.2 and section X).
- Type C: C.1 biological agents; C.2 toxins; C.3 means of delivery and
dissemination.
- Type D: D.1 radiological dispersal devices; D.2 means of contaminating territory,
water or food systems.
- Type E: E.1 small arms and light weapons destined for combat; E.2 artillery,
mortars and multiple-launch rocket systems; E.3 armoured fighting vehicles; E.4 anti-tank and anti-structure systems; E.5 landmines and cluster munitions; E.6 industrial explosive fill.
- Type F: F.1 combat aircraft; F.2 attack helicopters; F.3 armed remotely piloted
aircraft used as strike platforms; F.4 bombs and air-delivered stores.
- Type G: G.1 surface combatants configured for lethal strike; G.2 submarines
configured for lethal strike; G.3 naval missiles and torpedoes; G.4 naval mines; G.5 shipborne strike aviation.
- Type H: H.1 ballistic missiles; H.2 cruise missiles; H.3 hypersonic glide and
boost-glide systems; H.4 anti-ship and land-attack missiles and comparable offensive rockets.
- Type I: I.1 incendiary systems; I.2 thermobaric and fuel-air systems.
- Type J: J.1 weaponised high-energy lasers; J.2 other directed-energy beams of
destructive intensity.
- Type K: K.1 nuclear electromagnetic pulse; K.2 non-nuclear electromagnetic
pulse; K.3 high-power microwave; K.4 hostile radio-frequency systems.
- Type L: L.1 acoustic systems of irreversible effect; L.2 infrasonic and pressure
systems of irreversible effect.
- Type M: M.1 lethal autonomous weapons systems; M.2 artificial-intelligence
targeting and battle-management software integrated into lethal systems (article 17.2).
- Type N: N.1 kinetic anti-satellite interceptors; N.2 co-orbital destructive devices;
N.3 debris-generating weapons; N.4 nuclear or directed-energy weapons based in or transiting space for hostile use.
- Type O: O.1 hostile weather and precipitation modification; O.2 hostile climate
intervention, including solar-radiation management or carbon-cycle intervention used for coercion; O.3 hostile ionospheric heating; O.4 induced seismic, tectonic and volcanic disturbance; O.5 induced oceanic and tsunamigenic disturbance; O.6 hybrid explosive technologies coupled to a plate boundary or a fault.
- Type P: P.1 neurochemical vector; P.2 electromagnetic-neural vector; P.3
industrialised inductive-information vector; P.4 stacked combinations of the three vectors.
- Type Q: Q.1 implants configured to surveil or exfiltrate; Q.2 implants configured
to coerce, stimulate or inhibit; Q.3 implants configured as a bridge into another system; Q.4 implants used as the coupling surface of an irradiation attack.
- Type R: R.1 enclosed-chamber process devices, including chemostats,
configured as weapons lines; R.2 hostile command of an active zone.
- Type S: S.1 civilian industrial lines configured as weapons lines; S.2 dual-use
medical, pharmaceutical and neutron applications configured to feed another Type.
IV. Reading the classes without reducing them to four examples
Class 1, Types A to D. Weapons of mass effect
Nuclear explosive devices, and the industrial production of warheads and of delivery systems built to carry them, remain inside the halt. Chemical agents whose effects are not remediable, biological and toxin agents, and radiological devices — including any device whose purpose is the contamination of territory or of a water or food system by radioactive material — remain outside the two per cent. They are not “non-lethal tools” under another name. Hostile neutron irradiation belongs to Type A. It is radiation. They are not a civilian “neutron application” and they are not an implanted micro-device. Sections IX and X restate the research and certification rules for chemical and biological lines.
Class 2, Types E to H. Conventional kinetic industry
The conventional Types cover the industrial production of combat platforms and of the munitions they consume on land, in the air and at sea: small arms and light weapons destined for combat; artillery, mortars and multiple-launch rocket systems; armoured fighting vehicles; anti-tank and anti-structure systems; landmines and cluster munitions; combat aircraft and attack helicopters; armed remotely piloted aircraft used as strike platforms; bombs and air-delivered stores; surface combatants and submarines configured for lethal strike; torpedoes and naval mines; and the full missile spectrum — ballistic, cruise, hypersonic, anti-ship, land-attack and comparable offensive rockets. Existing platforms already in national stocks stay. New lines close.
Class 2, Type I. Incendiary, thermobaric and fuel-air systems
Incendiary, thermobaric and fuel-air systems designed to kill or to destroy by fire, overpressure or oxygen depletion remain inside the halt of new production.
Class 3, Types J to L. Energy, electromagnetic and acoustic weapons
Directed-energy systems designed to destroy persons, platforms or civil plant; electromagnetic pulse, high-power microwave and hostile radio-frequency systems; and acoustic or infrasonic systems designed for irreversible injury or death, are each a Type of their own. Electromagnetic weapons are not a chapter of cyber operations. A reversible software measure that can be lifted, leaving the machine intact, is one thing. A pulse or a microwave burst that burns a grid, a hospital wing or a flight computer is another. The Protocol treats them as different objects. Section XI is devoted to electromagnetic weapons (Type K).
Class 4, Types M and N. Autonomy and space
Lethal autonomous weapons systems — systems that select and apply lethal force without meaningful human control — are inside the halt. Autonomy used only to detect, track or recommend, with a human authorisation before force, is not the same object; it remains subject to the interception rules of section V and to the Court if abused. Destructive space weapons and debris-generating counter-space systems are inside the halt. Sensors for space situational awareness, and non-destructive collision-avoidance manoeuvres, are not.
Class 5, Type O. Environmental modification, geoengineering and meteorological weapons
This Class was omitted from the examples of 22 September 2026. That omission is corrected here and is developed in section XII. Hostile modification of weather, climate, precipitation, the ionosphere, seismic or tectonic conditions, oceanic conditions, or of any other environmental process, in order to harm a population, a harvest, a water cycle or a territory, is a weapon. It is not a civilian science programme under another letterhead. It does not enter the two per cent. It is not kept as a “reserve”. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD, adopted on 10 December 1976 and opened for signature on 18 May 1977) is the floor of the obligation, not the ceiling.
Class 6, Type P. Psycho-sociological and cognitive weapons
This Class was omitted from the first revision. It is not a figure of speech. A weapon that leaves buildings standing and still removes from a person, a class or a people the capacity to judge, to refuse, or to recover a prior state of mind, is a weapon of mass effect. It may arrive as a chemical load on neurotransmission; as an electromagnetic load on neural activity; or as a patterned inductive signal in the information environment. Where those three vectors are combined, the damage still falls within one Class. Section XIII is devoted to it. It is not folded into chemistry, into electromagnetics, or into cyber.
Class 7, Type Q. Implanted hybrid bio-electronic and neuro-digital weapons
A device placed in or on the body — a micro-circuit, a thermal-recharge implant, an auditory or optical micro-system, a neuro-digital interface — becomes a weapon when it is organised, funded or tasked to surveil without lawful cause, to coerce, to extract a stream of information (a fuite / exfiltration), or to serve as a bridge into another digital system. That object is Type Q. The implant may react under neutron irradiation.
Neutrons are radiation. An implant is an object. Conflating the two would let a ministry hide either. Section XIV is devoted to Type Q.
Class 8, Type R. Enclosed-chamber process systems and the active zone
A chemostat is a continuous enclosed-chamber process device. In civilian use it holds a biological or chemical culture at a steady state. It becomes a weapons line when it is organised, funded or tasked to produce or to hold a hostile agent in a chamber. The same logic applies when the chamber is no longer a laboratory vessel but an active zone: a house, a block, a neighbourhood, or any delimited inhabited volume whose climate, air, access or sensors can be commanded, used to deliver, to hold or to lock an effect on those inside. The object is the active zone. It cannot hide as “building management”. Types B, C, S and cyber may all be engaged.
Class 9, Type S. Dual-use configuration
A civilian industrial line — chemicals, aerospace, satellites, meteorology, high-energy physics, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, agriculture — becomes a weapons line when it is organised, funded or tasked to produce a system in Types A to Q. The building may stay. The configuration as a weapons line closes.
V. Interception and detection capabilities
A last symbolic production run for national defence reserves remains possible, as the Protocol already states, so that States retain flexibility during the transition. That run should be concentrated on interception and detection, not on new offensive platforms.
Radar, missile-defence shields, detection networks, electromagnetic jamming and defensive cyber measures used to intercept incoming threats are classified as arsenal 9 of interception. They are not treated as identical to the existing defensive arsenal already in stock. Existing defensive stocks remain as they are. Fresh production of interception and detection systems is, however, treated as heavy arsenal. The last symbolic production run authorised by the Protocol should therefore be directed mainly toward interception and detection capacities, not toward new offensive systems.
Hardening of hospitals, water, energy and food systems against electromagnetic pulse and against hostile radio-frequency attack may form part of the same interception effort.
9 Adjustment relative to the version of 23 September 2026: “cyber-jamming” is replaced by “electromagnetic jamming and defensive cyber measures”. Jamming acts in the electromagnetic spectrum; it is not a cyber operation (section XV, article 15.1).
Hardening is protection. It is not a licence to build an offensive electromagnetic weapon under a defensive name.
After ratification, participating States establish agreed plans for the closure of lethal production sites in every Class of section III.
VI. The two per cent reserved for non-lethal technologies
The Protocol retains two per cent of industrial capacity for non-lethal technologies whose side effects are remediable. Production is to be maintained at a stable and sufficient steady volume for fifty years — the period after which the Protocol is to be renewed on the same conditions, or amended by a two-thirds vote of UN delegations — and is to include the progressive replacement of national police arsenals.
Civilian weapons-recovery and buy-back programmes, with incentive campaigns for sale into national reserves, remain part of the same pillar. National police arsenals, and weapons later recovered from civilian circulation, will progressively pass, by common agreement, to the military defensive forces; or, in criminal cases linked to arms trafficking, they will be absorbed under the same framework. Any progressive increase of the national defensive reserve must be declared in a common database of shared arsenal inventories, while remaining in the custody and at the charge of each national reserve.
In the absence of precise data on how many States will accept the Protocol, and in the absence of a fully reinforced Interpol equipped with non-lethal weapons of reversible effect and of an international security cooperation among such units, the figure of two per cent remains an approximate working proposition, not a final ceiling. It may be revised upward only once, by a single increase, under the procedure of section XXIV, paragraph 5, and within the illustrative bound of the reference note below. The same 10 single-step rule applies to the Flux pilot and to the robotics and reconversion chain (article 8.12). Every non-lethal product of the two per cent is equally subject to the precondition of verified recycling, repair and end-of-life chains and to the prohibition of planned obsolescence (article 8.11).
Reference note — a realistic upper illustration
Switzerland offers a useful reference for scale. It combines a strong security position (armed neutrality, militia service, high readiness) with one of the highest civilian firearm
10 Clarification relative to the version of 23 September 2026: the two per cent is stated to be approximate, and may be increased only once, by a single upward revision, and never beyond the Swiss illustrative bound.
densities among stable democracies: on the order of 27.6 civilian firearms per 100 residents (Small Arms Survey estimates), together with very low firearm homicide.
That density is not proposed as a target. It is proposed only as an upper illustrative bound when calculating a realistic maximum share of industrial reconversion toward non-lethal weapons with reversible effects, pending better data on accession and on Interpol’s non-lethal capacity. A two-per-cent industrial reservation remains, on present information, a conservative working figure beneath that illustrative bound.
That two per cent is not biological. It is not radiological. It is not a meteorological weapon. It is not an electromagnetic pulse against a grid. It is not a psycho-sociological weapon against a class. It is not a neutron-irradiation weapon. It is not an implanted hybrid device configured as a weapon. The technologies contemplated are chemico-mechanical or mechanical and, where appropriate, cyber tools used with remediable effect. Examples of remediable cyber tools include: reversible encryption or reversible obfuscation of a system that can be lifted without permanent destruction; temporary withholding of access with cached restoration; time-limited electromagnetic or RF jamming that ceases when emission stops and leaves the underlying system intact; and non-kinetic seizure of an unauthorised drone for a controlled landing rather than its destruction. In every case the requirement is the same: the effect must be remediable, not permanent. The Protocol already gives as orientation temporary disorientation reversible by medical care within forty-eight hours. That standard remains the reference.
Police equipment within the two per cent. Devices whose effect cannot be quantified, measured and controlled in the individual case, or which by their design are prone to abuse, are prohibited and are not certified for the two per cent. Defensive police batons are permitted only as an exceptional defensive measure during extreme public conflicts or assemblies, when other means have proved ineffective, and never as a routine instrument of crowd management. Every use of force with equipment of the two per cent is subject to the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, precaution and accountability set out in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) and in the United Nations Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (2020). Article 2.2, paragraph 2, applies to abuse and to accidents.11
11 Addition relative to the version of 23 September 2026: police equipment of the two per cent is limited to quantifiable devices that are not prone to abuse; batons are admitted only as an exceptional defensive measure. The two United Nations instruments cited are not treaties; they are referred to as recognised standards.
Workers displaced from lethal production — on the order of ten million persons worldwide — receive transitional support and retraining toward sustainable fields, financed by the budgets freed by the halt of lethal manufacture and new substantial finance which comes with the other pillar — the recalculation of the monetary mass. Industrial conversion, where it occurs, is a conversion of output and of labour, not a demolition of every site. Common votes of UN nations are organised for the reconversion of sites in light of eventual chains of production and distribution of non-lethal systems, but production remains a national responsibility. From the military forces of national defence, or from common alliances, part of the personnel may be partially reconverted to Interpol missions equipped with non-lethal weapons.
VII. Social transition and reconversion of workers (complementary to section VI)
1. Each State adopts within 6 months a national reconversion plan covering workers, subcontractors and regions dependent on the weapons industry, with social dialogue under the standards of the International Labour Organization. 2. Guarantees: maintenance of income during retraining; priority hiring in civil conversion, ecological transition, the RoboTech and Sustainable Economy Initiative (section VIII), the 2 per cent non-lethal sector and enhanced Interpol; recognition of qualifications. 3. Financing: savings from the halt, an international conversion fund linked to the pillar of monetary recalculation, and loans for conversion of sites. 4. Scientists and engineers of the non-conventional Classes receive specific programmes to prevent the leakage of know-how (article 19.3(d)); their reallocation is governed by section VIII. 5. The reconversion of the workforce and of infrastructure is completed between month 12 and month 24 after entry into force (article 20.6).
VIII. Sustainable Technological and Industrial Reconversion: RoboTech and Sustainable Economy Initiative (Economic Pillar of Annex 1)
This chapter is the economic pillar of the present Annex. It ensures that the closure of lethal lines produces a market pivot, not a collapse.12
Article 8.1 — Object. The RoboTech and Sustainable Economy Initiative organises the transfer of the scientific, engineering and industrial capacity released by the halt of lethal production towards green technology and civilian robotics serving ecological agriculture and land management. It complements section VII and is carried out within the sustainable-economy pillar of the Protocol.
Article 8.2 — Reallocation of scientific and technical personnel. Scientists, engineers, software and artificial-intelligence specialists formerly employed in the weapons industry are offered priority programmes of reallocation towards green technology and robotics, in particular autonomous and assisted robots for permaculture, regenerative agriculture, agroforestry, ecological land management, ecosystem restoration and the clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war.
Article 8.3 — Labour shortage and dangerous tasks. Robots deployed under the Initiative take over human labour primarily where there is a shortage of personnel or where tasks are dangerous to health, including exposure to agrochemicals, heavy loads, extreme heat, steep terrain, demining and decontamination. Their deployment in other activities is organised through the social dialogue provided for in section VII.
Article 8.4 — Phasing out the chemical era of agriculture. The Initiative is directed towards the progressive replacement of synthetic pesticides and of the excessive use of synthetic fertilisers by mechanical, biological and precision methods: targeted mechanical weeding, selective intervention plant by plant, soil and biodiversity monitoring, and the maintenance of polycultures that cannot be managed at scale without such assistance. It contributes to Target 7 of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (2022), which calls for the overall risk from pesticides and highly hazardous chemicals to be reduced by at least half by 2030, and is guided by the ten
12 New chapter relative to the version of 23 September 2026. It develops the reconversion already announced in section VI and must be read together with section VII. No statistical estimate is introduced; the instruments cited are the Kunming- Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (2022), the FAO elements of agroecology (2019), the Basel Convention (1989), Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 and UN General Assembly resolution 73/284.
elements of agroecology approved by the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2019).
Article 8.5 — Ecological balance. Robotic permaculture also produces by-products, in particular batteries, electronic components and the energy required to manufacture and operate machines. These by-products are physical, countable and recoverable at the end of their life. Diffuse agrochemical loads, by contrast, enter soil, water, pollinators and the food chain, where they cannot be collected. For that reason the Initiative is considered ecologically preferable to chemical agriculture, provided that each programme is supported by an independent life-cycle assessment and complies with article 8.6.
Article 8.6 — Batteries and closed material loops. Each participating State ensures, for robots and equipment deployed under the Initiative: 1. extended producer responsibility for batteries and electronic components throughout their life cycle; 2. a deposit-return system for traction and industrial batteries; 3. closed-loop recovery of lithium, cobalt, nickel and other critical materials, with recovery targets set by the Conference of States Parties; 4. design for repair, reuse, second life and disassembly, and traceability of each battery; 5. no transboundary movement of waste batteries except in accordance with the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989). Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 concerning batteries and waste batteries may serve as a reference model.
Article 8.7 — Market and employment. The restoration of degraded land, the transition of agriculture away from chemical inputs and the recycling of materials are tasks of global extent. Together they constitute a civilian market able to absorb the workforce, the industrial sites and the supply chains released by the halt of lethal production. The Initiative contributes to the United Nations Decade on Ecosystem Restoration 2021–2030 (UN General Assembly resolution 73/284).
Article 8.8 — Civilian character. Robots, software and data of the Initiative are civilian. They may not be configured, funded or tasked as an Object of Type M, of Type S or of any other Type of section III; the configuration test of article 2.4 and the declaration rule of section XVIII apply. Agricultural data collected by them belong to the farmers and communities concerned.
Article 8.9 — Synchronisation with the recalculation of the monetary mass. 1. Industrial reconversion is synchronised with the recalculation of the monetary mass provided for in the first pillar of the Protocol, so that the liquidity required for reconversion is available at the moment each lethal line closes. 2. Flux, foreseen as a continuation of the Protocol within the sustainable-economy pillar, may be deployed on a strictly voluntary basis, including at micro or pilot scale during the early effective
phases, by participating States, regions, companies or cooperatives that so choose, as a liquidity vehicle for reconversion projects. 3. General deployment of Flux is foreseen approximately two years after the Protocol takes effect. Product-level eco-taxation applies in full within three years at most. 4. Nothing in this Annex obliges any national monetary, fiscal or banking structure to adopt Flux. The Protocol does not impose it. 5. 13 The scaling of the voluntary Flux pilot towards general deployment is subject to the single-step rule of article 8.12. As a principle, the liquidity channelled through Flux and the recalculated monetary mass is directed only to products whose repair and recycling chains are verified under article 8.11; this will be developed in the forthcoming Annex on the Recalculation of the Global Monetary Mass.
Article 8.10 — Timetable. National reconversion plans are adopted within 6 months (section VII). The reconversion of the workforce and of infrastructure under this chapter is carried out between month 12 and month 24 after entry into force (article 20.6).
Article 8.11 — Recycling, repair and end-of-life chains as a precondition of market authorisation. 1. Rationale. Robotics deployed under this Annex must clean the earth, not add new pollution. A reconversion that replaces chemical pollution by electronic waste would defeat the object of this chapter. 2. Precondition of authorisation. No robot, battery, component or other product of the Initiative may be placed on the market unless, on the day of its launch, its recycling, repair, reuse and reconversion chains are operational and have been verified. No product is launched without a verified end-of-life and repair chain. This condition is binding and admits no deferral. 3. Prohibition of planned obsolescence. Planned obsolescence is prohibited. For the purposes of this Annex, “planned obsolescence” means any technique, including in design, manufacture, software or after-sales practice, by which a producer deliberately reduces the lifespan or the repairability of a product. It includes software locks, updates that degrade performance or function, and parts pairing that prevents the use of compatible or independent spare parts. 4. Right to repair. Users, independent repairers and communities have a right to repair. Spare parts, repair tools, software and technical documentation are available throughout the lifetime of the product, on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. 5. Producer responsibility. The producer is responsible for the take-back of the product at the end of its life, including its batteries (article 8.6), and for its reuse, repair or recycling. 6. Verification and sanction. The chains referred to in this article are verified by the Verification Authority (article 20.3) by physical inspection under article 20.4, paragraph 8, and by the financial audit of article 20.4, paragraph 5. Non-compliance entails the suspension of market authorisation until compliance is restored,
13 Article 8.9 is consistent with the Protocol: the eco-tax applies in full within three years at most, and Flux is foreseen approximately two years after the Protocol, on a voluntary basis. The early pilot is voluntary and does not bind any national structure.
without prejudice to national penalties. 7. Reference instruments. Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 establishing a framework for ecodesign requirements for sustainable products, Directive (EU) 2024/1799 on common rules promoting the repair of goods, Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 concerning batteries and waste batteries, and article L441-2 of the French Consumer Code (Code de la consommation), which prohibits planned obsolescence, may serve as reference models. This Annex may go further than them; it never goes below them. 8. 14Principle for the monetary pillar. This circularity condition will be fully developed in the forthcoming Annex on the Recalculation of the Global Monetary Mass, where money creation and eco-taxation will be tied to verified repair and recycling chains.
Article 8.12 — One increase only. The voluntary Flux pilot and the robotics and reconversion chain may be scaled up only once, by a single decision. That decision may be taken only after inspectors have confirmed that the repair and recycling chains work. Step-by-step or repeated escalation is not permitted. This is the same rule as for the two per cent (section VI).
IX. Biological weapons
Biological weapons do not enter the two per cent. They are not reconverted into “non-lethal” tools. Their use and their hidden development remain incompatible with the Protocol.
A complementary rule is proposed for research, as a conjunctive aspect of this pillar and, in due course, of the Charter discussion.
14 Addition relative to the version of 23 September 2026 and to the first draft of 26 October 2026: article 8.11 makes operational recycling, repair, reuse and reconversion chains a precondition of market authorisation from the day of launch, prohibits planned obsolescence, establishes a right to repair and producer take-back, and entrusts verification to the Authority, with suspension of authorisation for non-compliance. Article 8.12 extends to the Flux pilot and to the robotics and reconversion chain the single-step increase rule already applied to the two per cent. Verification is by dedicated physical inspection before launch and at random thereafter (article 20.4, paragraph 8), in addition to the financial audit. As a statement of principle (article 8.9, paragraph 5, and article 8.11, paragraph 8), tying money creation and eco-taxation to verified chains is announced for the forthcoming Annex on the Recalculation of the Global Monetary Mass. No figure is introduced. Article 8.12 was later rewritten in simpler language, without change of meaning, and the single-step rule was extended to accession (section XXIV, paragraphs 8 and 9).
What is required is to declare first to one’s own State — and, as a company or laboratory, on paper — the nature of the research, the interests for society, and the working hypotheses. Only after that declaration, and after agreement of the competent national authority, may practical fundamental research begin. In that case the State is fully responsible for the production of national companies, or of any multinational congregation conducting medical research on its territory, including research on animals — domestic, industrial, or anywhere in a trophic chain — where a bioweapon potential exists. Researchers remain professionally responsible for adopted projects, which may be reconsidered or judged even after fifty years, or earlier, under the precautionary principle or in light of adopted diffusion.
They handle highly elaborate components. Intuition must be stated first, examined and supervised, before practice. First the theoretical file, then the practical work. That sequence is proposed as an international standard of transparency, not as an invitation to clandestine programmes.
X. Chemical and radiological weapons
Lethal chemical agents — those whose effects are not remediable — are excluded from the two per cent, in the same logic as biological weapons.
A narrower category of incapacitating chemical means, if and only if their effects are genuinely remediable under independent verification, may be examined for possible inclusion in the two per cent. That examination would take place under international certification. It does not reopen the door to classic lethal chemical arsenals. Any such means remains strictly within the Chemical Weapons Convention: riot-control agents only for law-enforcement purposes (article II.9(d)) and never as a method of warfare (article I.5).
Radiological devices, including the contamination of territory by radioactive material, do not belong in the two per cent. Their effects are not remediable in the sense of the Protocol. They remain on the prohibited side, together with nuclear weapons already covered by the Protocol’s definition of lethal arms.
XI. Class 3, Type K. Electromagnetic weapons — a Type of their own
Electromagnetic weapons are not cyber tools. They are not “an annex of the internet”. They act on matter and on circuits by energy delivered in the electromagnetic spectrum. They can stop a hospital, a pumping station, an aircraft’s flight controls or a city’s lighting without a single file being opened. For that reason they occupy their own line in the archive.
The Type includes, without being limited to: nuclear and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse devices designed as weapons; high-power microwave systems designed to disable or destroy persons or electronics; and hostile radio-frequency systems whose intended effect is irreversible injury, death, or the lasting destruction of civil infrastructure. The Type does not include ordinary communications, navigation, radar used as a sensor, or time-limited jamming that ceases when emission stops and leaves the underlying system intact.
Offensive electromagnetic weapons fall under the halt of lethal production. Their effects on civil life — energy, water, food cold-chain, transport, hospitals, laboratories — are in most configurations not remediable within the forty-eight-hour medical standard, nor remediable as a system that can simply be “switched back on”. Burnt transformers, destroyed flight computers and lost medical devices are not a reversible encryption. They therefore do not enter the two per cent.
A State-directed electromagnetic attack against the civil systems of another State is an act to be declared to the Geopolitical Court, in the same way as a cyber war or an economic aggression. The answer remains non-lethal: a binding ruling, isolation where necessary, reparations, remediable counter-measures. It is not a return to kinetic retaliation.
Protective hardening of critical civil systems against electromagnetic attack may be part of the interception arsenal of section V. The distinction is the same as everywhere in this pillar: the shield may be strengthened; the offensive line closes.
XII. Class 5, Type O. Environmental modification, geoengineering and meteorological weapons — a Class of their own
Weather is not a neutral background of war. It is, when forced for hostile purpose, a weapon. The Protocol therefore names this Class instead of leaving it under “comparable platforms” or under cyber. Tectonic plates and faults are part of the same Class. They are not a metaphor and they are not an implant.
The Class includes any technique that modifies, through deliberate human action, the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth — including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere and space — when that technique is used for military or any other hostile purpose. The examples that must be stated, because they have been studied as weapons and because they are easily hidden inside civilian programmes, are these: hostile weather modification; forced precipitation or forced drought over a territory or a harvest; manipulation of storms or of temperature as a means of pressure or of harm; ionospheric heating used to disrupt communications, navigation or populations rather than to study the upper atmosphere; induced or attempted seismic, volcanic or
oceanic disturbance; and large-scale geoengineering deployed as a means of coercion — including solar-radiation management or carbon-cycle intervention used to harm, to blackmail or to starve, rather than under an open civilian mandate subject to the Court.
Civilian meteorology, civilian climate science, civilian disaster prevention and open geoengineering research conducted for the protection of the climate are not, by that fact alone, weapons. They become a weapons line when they are organised, funded or tasked to produce a hostile effect of the kind just named. The declaration rule of section XVIII applies to them with the same severity as to biological research: first the theoretical file, addressed to one’s own State, stating the nature of the work, the interest for society and the working hypotheses; only then, and only with the agreement of the competent national authority, the practical work. The State remains responsible for companies, laboratories and multinational congregations on its territory.
Tectonic plates, faults, and hybrid explosive technologies
The lithosphere is named because it can otherwise be left out of “weather”. A hostile attempt to induce, steer, accelerate or hold an earthquake, a tremor sequence, a landslide, a volcanic pulse or a tsunamigenic displacement belongs to Type O. So does a distinct object that must be written in full: hybrid explosive technologies linked with tectonic plates or with faults. That object is an explosive line — conventional high explosive, nuclear explosive, or irradiation explosive — organised, funded or tasked to act on a plate boundary, a fault, a volcanic edifice or a submarine slope, so that the explosion is not the whole event and the Earth system is used as the rest of the weapon. The Understandings annexed to ENMOD already list earthquakes. The Protocol takes that list as a floor and names the hybrid explosive case so that a ministry cannot call the charge “only munitions” and the plate “only geology”. The charge remains Type E or Type A. The coupling to the plate is Type O. Both close.
Civilian seismology, tsunami warning, volcanic monitoring and the study of plate tectonics are not weapons. Reservoirs, mining, geothermal work and injection wells can induce local seismicity; they become a weapons line when they are organised, funded or tasked to produce a hostile tectonic or seismic effect. The declaration rule of section XVIII applies. This Annex does not describe how a fault would be forced. Classification is the duty. A tectonic or seismic weapon is not a reserve. Its effects on cities, on coasts and on the plate itself are not remediable inside forty-eight hours.
ENMOD already binds a large number of States. The Protocol does not weaken ENMOD. It extends the same logic into the industrial halt, into the audit of production sites and supply chains, into the Geopolitical Court, and into the fifty-year review. A meteorological or geoengineering weapon is not a reserve. It is not stored “in case”. It is not part of the two per cent. Its effects on harvests, on water, on habitat and on the
climate system are not remediable inside forty-eight hours, and often not remediable at all inside a human generation.
A State-directed hostile use of environmental modification against another State, or against a population, is to be declared to the Geopolitical Court. The answer is the Court’s answer: ruling, isolation where necessary, reparations, remediable counter-measures. Not a climate war in return.
XIII. Class 6, Type P. Psycho-sociological and cognitive weapons — psycho-hacking, a Class of their own
A society can be damaged without a crater. The Protocol therefore names a Class that acts on judgment, on impulse, on memory and on the common capacity of a population or of a social class to refuse an order that would harm. Military writing already uses neighbouring words — psychological operations, cognitive warfare, influence operations. Those words are too soft when the intended effect is irreversible. This Annex uses a harder name: psycho-sociological weapons. The popular name psycho-hacking is accepted as a designation of the same Class. A “psycho-virus” in this text is not a metaphor for a rumour. It is a designed agent or a designed signal whose purpose is to occupy, lock or overload neural or social processing so that a person or a class remains fixed on one impulse and cannot recover the filter of conscience within the remediable standard of the Protocol.
Three vectors, one Class
The Class has three vectors. They may be used alone. They may be used together. Together does not create a further Class; it aggravates the first.
First vector — neurochemical. An agent that acts on neurotransmission, or that deposits in nervous tissue a persistent toxic load, is a chemical weapon when it poisons the body. It is also, when the intended target is judgment or the behaviour of a class, a psycho-sociological weapon. Persistent metallic and other neurotoxic loads belong here when they are introduced as a weapon or as a dual-use product line configured as a weapon. No specific substance is named in this Annex: the identification of neurotoxic loads configured as weapons belongs to the scientific and technical panel of the verification Authority (article 15.4, paragraph 5), on verifiable evidence. That rule does
not make any civilian medical use of a substance an act of war. Configuration and 15 intent decide, as everywhere in this pillar. Where the load is not remediable inside the forty-eight-hour standard — and a persistent tissue deposit is not — the line is outside the two per cent.
Second vector — electromagnetic action on neural activity. Type K already covers offensive electromagnetic pulse and high-power microwave against bodies and against infrastructure. This second vector is narrower and is not absorbed by Type K: a radio-frequency or other electromagnetic emission designed not to burn a transformer but to occupy, lock or overload neural activity, so that a brain remains fixed on one information or one impulse. Long-wave and other radio emissions are named as a field of concern, not as an instruction. Ordinary broadcasting, navigation and medical imaging are not this vector. An emission becomes this vector when it is organised, funded or tasked to produce a non-remediable cognitive effect. Protective shielding of hospitals, schools and dwellings against such an emission may form part of the interception arsenal of section V. The offensive line closes.
Third vector — mass inductive information without a remediable off-switch. Advertising, speech, art and political campaigning are not weapons by the fact that they persuade. They become this vector when they are industrialised as a system designed to remove the psychological filter of a population or of a class — to fix an impulse to consume past refusal, or, worse, an impulse to harm — and when that fixation is not remediable by ordinary contradiction, education or the passage of forty-eight hours. A private fraud remains a crime for Interpol. A State-directed or State-tolerated system that uses this vector against a population or a class is to be declared to the Geopolitical Court.
The three vectors are most dangerous when they are stacked: a chemical load that reduces the filter of conscience, an electromagnetic load that holds one information in place, and an inductive campaign that tells the held information what to do. Stacking does not move the object into cyber. It remains Type P.
What this Class is not
This Class is not a verdict on any particular civilian vaccination campaign, nor a finding that a licensed medical product already administered is, by that fact, a weapon. Medical products, adjuvants and delivery systems are dual-use. They fall under Type S and
15 Adjustment relative to the version of 23 September 2026: that version named aluminium. The name is removed so that Class 6 cannot be dismissed as a position on a particular medical product. The substance of the first vector is unchanged, and identification is entrusted to the scientific panel on evidence.
under the declaration rule of section XVIII when they are organised, funded or tasked to introduce a persistent neuro-active or neurotoxic load as a weapon, or to prepare a class for the second or third vector. Open therapeutic research, declared to the State, authorised, and conducted for the health of the person, remains research. Hidden development of a cognitive weapon inside a health programme is incompatible with the Protocol, in the same way as hidden biological development. Education, liturgy, journalism and lawful marketing are excluded under article 15.4, paragraph 4.16
A State-directed psycho-sociological attack against a population or a social class is to be declared to the Geopolitical Court. The answer remains the Court’s answer: ruling, isolation where necessary, reparations, remediable counter-measures. It is not a return to kinetic retaliation, and it is not a return to a cognitive war in the other direction.
XIV. Class 7, Type Q. Implanted hybrid bio-electronic and neuro-digital weapons — and neutron irradiation
The implant is named here. Hostile neutron irradiation is named here. The implant can be the object that reacts under a neutron-irradiation attack.
Neutron irradiation — radiation, not a slogan
Hostile neutron irradiation — enhanced radiation delivered to kill, to disable, or to act on a living body or on a device in that body — is Type A. It is radiation. New production of systems designed for that irradiation stops. Because focalised irradiation can kill individually, those means require deep surveillance: declaration, national surveillance enhanced by foreign rotating missions where they are held, and protection of the medical data that would make a body map precise. Existing means, if any are held, are declared with the nuclear and radiological inventory. Civilian neutron applications — radiography, industrial gauging, licensed nuclear medicine — are not weapons by that fact. They become a weapons line when they are organised, funded or tasked to produce a hostile irradiation effect, or to feed Type A. They then fall under Type S and under the declaration rule of section XVIII. This Annex does not describe how such irradiation is produced.
16 Deletion relative to the version of 23 September 2026: the paragraph that began “This family is also not a ban on education, liturgy, journalism or lawful marketing” and closed on a question has been removed. The Annex affirms; it does not ask. The exclusions it listed remain in article 15.4, paragraph 4, and the test it restated remains in articles 2.2 and 2.5.
The implant reacted under neutron irradiation
A human-borne micro-device — electronic, thermal-recharge, auditory, optical, or a neuro-digital interface — can be configured as a weapon in its own right: to watch, to coerce, to extract a stream of information (a fuite), or to serve as a bridge into a third-party digital system. That is Type Q.
The same implant can also be the object that reacts under a neutron-irradiation attack: altered, jammed, erased, or forced by radiation so that the device, the person, or a system linked to the person is harmed or opened. The danger is not only collective. Hostile neutron irradiation that is focalised on very specific points of a precise body map can kill or disable a person individually. For that reason the means that produce or direct such irradiation cannot stand without deep surveillance. A hack of medical data — hospital files, imaging, scans, anatomical maps, implant registers — can be linked to a hard irradiation attack: the map tells where to focalise; the irradiation is the strike. Theft or covert use of those files is therefore not only a privacy crime. When it is organised to prepare or to aim an irradiation attack, it engages Type Q, Type A and section XVI (cyber) together. Medical data of the body map must be treated as a protected object 17 of this pillar. This Annex does not describe how irradiation is focalised. In that case the irradiation is Type A and the implant is Type Q. The hybrid is both. A ministry may not call the event “only radiation” and hide the implant, nor call it “only a medical device” and hide the irradiation. If the reacted implant is then used as a bridge into another digital system, section XVI (cyber) is also engaged.
Consent obtained under exploitation is not consent. A person who “approves” an implant because a position, a care pathway or a threat leaves no real refusal has not authorised a weapons line. The State remains responsible for companies and congregations that place such devices on its territory.
Licensed therapeutic implants — pacemakers, cochlear devices, declared neuro-prostheses — remain medical so long as they are organised for the health of the person, declared, and not tasked to surveil, to coerce, to exfiltrate, to bridge, or to serve as the coupling surface of an irradiation attack. Hidden development of a human-borne weapons interface inside a health or “wellness” programme is incompatible with the Protocol.
17 Adjustment relative to the version of 23 September 2026: that version wrote “family XII (cyber)”. Cyber is a section of the Annex, not a Type of the archive; the reference is corrected (now section XVI after renumbering).
Type Q does not enter the two per cent where the effect is not remediable. Protective detection of unauthorised implants, and the lawful removal of a device that is a weapon, may form part of the interception effort of section V. The offensive line closes.
A State-directed use of implanted devices, or of neutron irradiation against an implant or against the person who carries it, is to be declared to the Geopolitical Court. The answer remains the Court’s answer. It is not a return to kinetic retaliation.
XV. Legal and technical definitions of the non-conventional classes — complementary to sections XI to XIV
Sections XI to XIV already describe these Classes and Types. This chapter adds, for each, a definition in treaty form, its constitutive elements, the exclusions, and the line separating it from cyber operations. It does not replace the descriptions already given.
Article 15.1 — Common rule distinguishing these Classes from cyber operations. 1. “Cyber operation” means, in accordance with the scope used by the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2017), the use of computer code, data or network access to affect a computer system, network or the data they hold, through the logical layer. 2. A Type of articles 15.2 to 15.5 is engaged, and the event is not merely a cyber operation, whenever the harmful effect is produced by: (a) energy delivered through the electromagnetic, acoustic or radiation spectrum to matter, circuits or living tissue; (b) deliberate manipulation of a physical, chemical or biological environmental process; (c) a neuro-active agent or a signal acting directly on the nervous system; or (d) a device placed in or on the human body. 3. Where a cyber operation and one of these Types are combined, both are engaged cumulatively (section XVI). Qualification of the cyber component never absorbs or downgrades the other Type. 4. Treaty regimes on cyber operations, existing or future, are without prejudice to this Annex.
Article 15.2 — Electromagnetic weapons (Class 3, Types J, K and L; section XI). 1. Definition. An electromagnetic weapon is any system designed, configured or tasked to deliver electromagnetic energy — including laser and other directed-energy beams, high-power microwave, radio-frequency energy, and nuclear or non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse — in order to kill, injure, permanently disable persons, or to destroy or permanently disable materiel, electronics or civilian infrastructure. Acoustic, ultrasonic and infrasonic systems with irreversible effect (Type L) are subject to the same regime. 2. Constitutive elements: (a) an emitter or generator; (b) a means of directing or coupling the energy to a target; (c) a design power, energy density or duration sufficient for an irreversible effect; (d) a hostile tasking or the effect element of article 2.5. 3. Floor instruments. Protocol IV to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW) on Blinding Laser Weapons (1995) remains fully applicable and is the floor; this article extends its logic to all irreversible electromagnetic effects. 4. Exclusions: communications, broadcasting, navigation, radar used as a sensor, medical imaging and therapy, industrial and scientific uses, and time-limited jamming whose effect ceases with emission and leaves the system intact (section VI), provided none is tasked for hostile irreversible effect. 5. Cyber distinction: the effect is physical and is produced without the need to access any code or data. A burnt circuit is not a cyber event.
Article 15.3 — Environmental-modification, geoengineering and meteorological weapons (Class 5, Type O; section XII). 1. Definition. Taking as a floor article II of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 31/72 of 10 December 1976, in force 5 October 1978), an environmental-modification weapon is any technique for changing — through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes — the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space, when developed, configured or used for military or any other hostile purpose, including coercion, blackmail, or harm to harvests, water resources, health or habitat. 2. Removal of the ENMOD threshold. ENMOD article I prohibits such use having “widespread, long-lasting or severe” effects. Under this Annex, no threshold of scale applies: the hostile purpose suffices. The thresholds of articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I (1977) and of article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute remain applicable in their own fields and are not lowered. 3. Geoengineering. Large-scale solar-radiation management, carbon-dioxide removal or ocean and atmospheric intervention are covered when tasked for hostile purpose or conducted in secret. Open civilian research remains subject to decision X/ 33, paragraph 8(w), of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010) and subsequent decisions, and to the declaration rule of section XVIII. 4. Hybrid tectonic coupling: section XII applies in full; the charge and the coupling are separate offences. 5. Exclusions: civilian meteorology, weather forecasting and declared cloud seeding for civilian water or hail management with prior notice to neighbouring States; climate science; seismic, volcanic and tsunami monitoring; disaster prevention. 6. Cyber distinction: the harm is transmitted through a natural process, not through a computer system, even when computers control the technique.
Article 15.4 — Psycho-sociological and cognitive weapons (Class 6, Type P; section XIII). 1. Definition. A psycho-sociological or cognitive weapon is any agent, signal, system or organised technique designed, configured or tasked by or on behalf of a State, or by an organised armed or non-State group, to produce in persons or in a population a non-consensual and irreversible alteration of cognitive functions — perception, memory, judgment, volition or emotional regulation — or of the collective
capacity of a group to deliberate and refuse, through one or more of the three vectors defined in section XIII. 2. Constitutive elements: (a) a defined target (person, group or population); (b) a vector (neurochemical, electromagnetic-neural, or industrialised informational); (c) the intent or effect element of article 2.5; (d) the absence of free and informed consent; (e) irreversibility under article 2.2. 3. Floor instruments: the Biological Weapons Convention (1972) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) for the neurochemical vector; article 36 of Additional Protocol I (review of new weapons); the right to freedom of thought (article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); and the work of the UN Human Rights Council on neurotechnology and human rights, including resolution 51/3 (2022), together with the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Neurotechnology (2025). 4. Exclusions: licensed medicine and psychiatry with informed consent; education; religion; journalism; art; lawful advertising and political speech; public-health information. Persuasion is not a weapon. The test is irreversibility plus design or tasking. 5. Evidentiary rule: allegations under this article are examined by the scientific panel of article 20.3 on the basis of verifiable evidence; no finding is made against a medical product or public-health programme without such examination. 6. Cyber distinction: information carried by networks is only the medium of the third vector; the object of the prohibition is the designed effect on the human mind, not the computer system. 7. Neural data and mental integrity. Data recorded from, or inferred about, the nervous system (neural data) are a protected category. No State or private actor may collect, process, transfer or use neural data for military, intelligence or coercive purposes, or without free, prior and informed consent. Each State guarantees in its law the protection of mental integrity, mental privacy and freedom of thought against misuse of neurotechnology, consistent with article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Council resolution 51/3 (2022) and the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Neurotechnology (2025).18
Article 15.5 — Implanted hybrid bio-electronic and neuro-digital weapons (Class 7, Type Q; section XIV). 1. Definition. An implanted or human-borne weapon is any electronic, bio-electronic, optical, acoustic or neuro-digital device placed in, on or under the human body, or any neural interface, which is designed, configured, modified or remotely tasked to surveil without lawful authority, coerce, injure, stimulate or inhibit neural activity without consent, extract data from the body or the nervous system, or serve as a bridge into another system. 2. Constitutive elements: (a) a device in physical contact with or inside the body; (b) a capability of sensing, emitting, stimulating or
18 Addition relative to the version of 23 September 2026: a paragraph on neural data and mental integrity (“neuro-rights”) closes the gap between Type P (effects on the mind) and Type Q (devices in the body): data taken from the nervous system cannot become the target map of either.
communicating; (c) a hostile tasking or the effect element; (d) absence of free, prior and informed consent, which cannot be given under coercion (section XIV). 3. Exclusions: licensed therapeutic and assistive devices (pacemakers, cochlear implants, neurostimulators, declared neuroprostheses) used for the health of the person, with consent, under medical-device regulation. 4. Duties of manufacturers: secure-by-design, no undeclared remote access, a register of implanted devices protected as medical data, and a duty to report any State request for access. 5. Cyber distinction: the object is the body and the device; a cyber operation used against or through the implant engages section XVI cumulatively.
XVI. Cyber tools, cybercrime and cyber war
Cyber tools with remediable effect may belong to the two per cent: a capacity that interrupts a system and can then be lifted, leaving no permanent destruction, is consistent with the reversible logic of the pillar.
A lone or private intrusion remains a crime. It is not an act of war. It is a matter for enhanced Interpol, in international collaboration, under criminal law.
A cyber operation supported or directed by a State is another matter. It is not “only a missing file” and it is not only a blocked server. It can strike civil life directly: hospitals and medical security; energy; water and food supply; transport; financial systems; and biological security, including laboratories and health databases. When those effects are produced by a State against another State, the situation is already a form of war — a cyber war — comparable in nature to an economic war. It is not a war only on paper.
Such a situation must be declared to the Geopolitical Court provided by the Protocol, in the same way as a territorial dispute, an economic aggression, an electromagnetic attack, a hostile environmental modification, or any other conflict that a community or a State cannot settle by ordinary means. The Protocol insists on the Court. The answer remains non-lethal: a binding ruling, isolation where necessary, reparations, remediable counter-measures. It is not a return to kinetic retaliation.
There is at present no complete international instrument that draws the line between a criminal intrusion and an act of cyber war. It is therefore proposed that participating States adopt, in the same protocol space and by parliamentary process, an international law setting that threshold — adopted together with the sustainability instruments already contemplated in the fifth pillar (taxation and the law of concentric commercial parameters). Random private actors remain under criminal law. A State that supports the attack is already in a situation of war and must answer before the Court.
Electromagnetic weapons, meteorological weapons, psycho-sociological weapons, neutron weapons and implanted hybrid devices are cited in this section only to mark the border. They are not absorbed by it. An implant used as a bridge into a third-party system engages Type Q and this section together.
XVII. Further types and actors: closing residual loopholes
Article 17.1 — Lethal autonomous weapons (Class 4, Type M). “Meaningful human control” requires that a human: understands the system and its context; authorises each use of lethal force against a specific target or class in a defined time and space; and can stop it. Systems that cannot meet this standard are prohibited from production. Reference: UN General Assembly resolutions 78/241 (2023) and 79/62 (2024) and the joint call of the UN Secretary-General and the ICRC President (2023).
Article 17.2 — Artificial intelligence in targeting. Software for target selection, decision support and battle management is part of the weapons industry when integrated into lethal systems. It is declared, reviewed under article 36 of Additional Protocol I and audited by the Authority.
Article 17.3 — Space (Class 4, Type N). Without prejudice to article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the production and testing of destructive anti-satellite systems are prohibited, in line with UN General Assembly resolution 77/41 (2022) on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests.
Article 17.4 — Private military and security companies. The halt applies to them in full. States remain responsible for them (article 19.1). The Montreux Document (2008) is the floor. Offering lethal services that replace closed production is prohibited.
Article 17.5 — Transfers and exports. Exports of lethal weapons from new production cease with that production. Transfers from existing stocks are notified to the Authority and remain subject to the Arms Trade Treaty (2013), in particular its articles 6, 7 and 11 (prohibitions, risk assessment, diversion).
Article 17.6 — Maintenance. Maintenance, repair and safety work on existing stocks is permitted. Upgrades that add new lethal capability count as new production.
Article 17.7 — Research. Research beyond the declared theoretical stage (section XVIII) towards a new lethal system counts as production.
XVIII. Declaration rule for dual-use research beyond biology
The sequence already stated for biological research — theoretical file first, national declaration, authorisation, then practical work — is extended, as a conjunctive rule of
this pillar, to any research programme that carries a credible potential to become a system in Types J, K, O, P or Q, and to neutron applications capable of feeding Type A: directed energy of destructive intensity; electromagnetic pulse or high-power microwave of hostile effect; environmental modification / geoengineering / meteorological techniques capable of hostile use; psycho-sociological or cognitive techniques capable of non-remediable effect on judgment, impulse or the behaviour of a class; implanted or human-borne bio-electronic and neuro-digital interfaces configured to surveil, coerce, exfiltrate or bridge; and neutron-generating or enhanced-radiation work beyond an authorised civilian mandate.
The State is responsible for the companies, laboratories and multinational congregations on its territory. Researchers remain professionally responsible for adopted projects, which may be reconsidered or judged even after fifty years, or earlier, under the precautionary principle or in light of adopted diffusion. The sequence is an international standard of transparency. It is not an invitation to clandestine programmes.
XIX. State responsibility for leakage and proliferation of non-conventional technologies
Article 19.1 — Attribution. In accordance with the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (International Law Commission, 2001, annexed to UN General Assembly resolution 56/83), the State is responsible for the conduct of: its organs, including ministries of defence, intelligence services and military research institutes (article 4); persons and entities empowered to exercise governmental authority, including State-owned or contracted companies (article 5); and persons or groups acting on its instructions or under its direction or control (article 8), including private military and security companies.
Article 19.2 — Duty of prevention (due diligence). Each State exercises due diligence to prevent any transfer, leakage, sale, theft, unauthorised publication or personnel movement by which a technology, know-how, equipment or data of Types J, K, L, O, P, Q or R — and in particular environmental-modification and meteorological techniques — passes from its military or security sector to a private entity, a non-State actor or another State outside the regime of this Annex. This duty is inspired by the obligation not to allow one’s territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States (International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel, 1949) and by the duty of prevention of transboundary harm (ILC Draft Articles, 2001).
Article 19.3 — Measures required (modelled on UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), paragraphs 2 and 3): (a) criminalisation of such transfer; (b) accounting and physical protection of sensitive items; (c) export, transit and brokering controls, including
intangible transfers of technology; (d) vetting and post-employment restrictions for personnel leaving the defence sector; (e) control over privatisation, sale or dissolution of defence research entities; (f) declaration to the Authority of any loss within 72 hours.
Article 19.4 — Responsibility for leakage. A State that fails to exercise due diligence incurs responsibility for the resulting harm, even if the final act is committed by a private or non-State actor. The breach is continuing (article 14 of the ILC Articles) as long as the technology remains out of control and the State does not take the measures available to recover or neutralise it. Aid or assistance knowingly given to another State’s breach also engages responsibility (article 16).
Article 19.5 — Consequences. Cessation and guarantees of non-repetition; full reparation by restitution, compensation and satisfaction (articles 30, 31 and 34–37 of the ILC Articles), including restoration of environment, harvests and water resources; joint liability where several States contributed. Disputes are brought before the Geopolitical Court. Individual criminal responsibility of officials and company managers is without prejudice to State responsibility.
Article 19.6 — Burden of proof. Where a Type-O or Type-P technology is found in the hands of a non-State actor and is traceable to a State programme, the State concerned bears the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence.
XX. Verification and audit framework for the industrial status quo
Article 20.1 — Standstill. From the date of signature, each State refrains from any act that would defeat the object of this Annex (article 18 of the Vienna Convention, 1969), in particular from opening new lethal production lines, expanding existing capacity, or transferring production abroad. The industrial status quo is fixed at the reference date of 31 December 202619 : no lethal production capacity may exceed that declared on that date.
Article 20.2 — Initial declarations. Within 90 days of signature, each State declares, by Class, Type and Series of section III: (a) every production, assembly, test and research site; (b) installed capacity and production of the last five years; (c) main suppliers and specifically designed dual-use inputs; (d) companies, subsidiaries and foreign licences; (e) defence budget lines for procurement and research; (f) inventories of existing stocks (section I), kept in national reserve under national surveillance,
19 Clarification relative to the version of 23 September 2026: the freeze “by the end of this year” is expressed as a reference date for declared capacity. No lethal production capacity may exceed that declared on 31 December 2026; actual reductions then follow the timetable of article 20.6.
enhanced by foreign rotating missions. Declarations are confidential in detail and public in aggregate.
Article 20.3 — Verification Authority. An International Authority for the Verification of the Halt of Lethal Production is established, modelled on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and on the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with: a Conference of States Parties; an Executive Council with rotating regional seats and no veto; a Technical Secretariat with an inspectorate; a scientific and technical panel for non-conventional Classes (articles 15.2–15.5); and a link with the Geopolitical Court and with enhanced Interpol. Inspectors are drawn preferentially from States without a military-industrial base (section I).
Article 20.4 — Verification tools. 1. Routine on-site inspections of declared sites, with seals, cameras and production counters on closed lines. 2. Challenge inspections of any site, declared or not, on short notice (inspired by article IX of the CWC), with managed access to protect legitimate secrets unrelated to the Annex. 3. Satellite, open-source and remote-sensing monitoring, including thermal and industrial-activity indicators. 4. Supply-chain monitoring of specifically designed inputs (energetic materials, propellants, fissile and neutron sources, high-power emitters, guidance components), building on Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR and Nuclear Suppliers Group lists. 5. Financial audit: defence procurement contracts, export credits, sovereign funds and banks financing lethal production; cooperation with financial-intelligence units. 6. Environmental sampling and atmospheric monitoring for Types A, C, D and O, using existing networks (CTBTO International Monitoring System, WMO) where their mandates permit. 7. Protection of whistleblowers: confidential reporting channel to the Authority; prohibition of retaliation; protection of identity; access to asylum or relocation where needed. 8. Physical inspection of recycling, repair, reuse and reconversion chains (article 8.11): on-site inspection of each chain before the launch of the product concerned, and random on-site inspections thereafter, including verification of take-back, spare-parts availability, repair documentation and the absence of planned obsolescence.
Article 20.5 — Conversion of lines. Each closed line is subject to a conversion plan (civil output, non-lethal 2 per cent, or mothballing under seal), verified by the Authority. Equipment specifically designed for lethal production is disabled or placed under seal; buildings and workers are converted (sections VI, VII and VIII).
Article 20.6 — Timetable. - Signature: standstill (article 20.1). - 31 December 2026: reference date of the status quo. - Months 1–3 after entry into force: declarations and baseline inspection (consistent with Phase 1 of the Protocol). - First tier — by the end of month 6, strict and not extendable: immediate cessation of all weapon testing, of research and development beyond the declared theoretical stage, and of the
operational deployment of any newly produced lethal Object or of any Series not declared at the reference date. Safety and surveillance testing of existing stocks under article 17.6 is not affected. National reconversion plans are adopted (section VII). - Months 7–12: closure of new-design lines; last symbolic run directed to interception and detection (section V). - Months 13–18: reduction to the 98 per cent target; certification of the 2 per cent. - Second tier — months 12–24: Sustainable Industrial Reconversion of the workforce and of infrastructure (sections VII and VIII), synchronised with the recalculation of the monetary mass (article 8.9). - Thereafter: annual reports, five-20 yearly review, fifty-year renewal.
Article 20.7 — Non-compliance. Graduated response: (1) request for clarification within 30 days; (2) consultations and corrective plan; (3) finding by the Executive Council and public report; (4) suspension of rights and of benefits under the other pillars, in particular the monetary recalculation; (5) referral to the Geopolitical Court and, where international peace and security are threatened, to the UN Security Council and General Assembly; (6) non-lethal enforcement by enhanced Interpol in accordance with the Court’s ruling.
XXI. Security guarantees for participating States
Security is the first question of every ministry. This chapter answers it.
1. Defence preserved. Existing arsenals and munitions remain (section I). No State is asked to disarm its stocks or leave an alliance. 2. Reciprocity and simultaneity. Reductions are carried out simultaneously and verifiably by all participating States, according to the timetable of article 20.6. No State reduces before the others. 3. Entry into force. The halt becomes binding when ratified by two thirds of the Member States of the United Nations, consistent with the two-thirds rule of the Protocol. 4. Interception shield. Each State keeps and may modernise interception, detection and protective hardening (section V). 5. Collective assistance. Any participating State attacked receives immediate assistance: emergency session of the Geopolitical Court within 72 hours,
20 Adjustment relative to the version of 23 September 2026: the transition now has two tiers. The first tier (6 months, strict) halts testing, research and development and new deployment; the second tier (months 12 to 24) concerns workers and sites. The 18-month reduction calendar and the reference date of 31 December 2026 are unchanged. Existing stocks remain at national disposal (section I).
deployment of enhanced Interpol non-lethal units, economic isolation of the aggressor, and protection of civilians. 6. Release clause.21 In the event of armed aggression by a non-participating State, or by a State found in material breach, the State attacked may, after notifying the Authority and the Court, reactivate sealed lines for the duration of the aggression, under monitoring. This is a safeguard, not a reservation. 7. Withdrawal. Withdrawal is possible only for extraordinary events jeopardising supreme interests, with notice of 6 months to all Parties and to the Security Council stating the reasons (cf. article X of the NPT), and does not release the State from obligations incurred, including those of section XIX. 8. Transparency as security. Verified mutual transparency reduces strategic surprise, which is the main driver of arms races.
XXII. Relationship with other instruments (savings clause)
1. Nothing in this Annex limits or derogates from obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, the NPT, the BWC, the CWC, ENMOD, the CCW and its Protocols, the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions, the Arms Trade Treaty, regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, or human-rights law. 2. In case of conflict, the provision affording greater protection to persons and to the environment prevails. 3. Existing verification bodies (IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO, BWC Implementation Support Unit) keep their mandates; the Authority cooperates with them and avoids duplication. 4. Article 51 of the UN Charter is not affected.
XXIII. Submission to political opposition and binding timetable for legislative adoption
The Protocol is not submitted only to the government in office. It must be transmitted, with a precise agenda, to the political opposition in each participating State, so that adoption is a national act and not the act of a single majority.
21 Addition relative to the version of 23 September 2026: the release clause (paragraph 6) and the withdrawal clause (paragraph 7, modelled on article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) are retained as security guarantees for ministries of defence. They are bounded by notification, monitoring and the continuing obligations of section XIX.
Transmission to the opposition takes place at the same time as transmission to the executive and to parliament, or within a short, fixed interval set in the agenda annexed to the Protocol. The opposition receives the full text, the five pillars, the draft national and international instruments, and the calendar of votes. Silence or absence of the opposition does not suspend the calendar; it does not enlarge it either.
The delay for resolution and for the adoption of the laws that accompany the Protocol is strict. It follows the timetable already contained in the Protocol. That timetable is not indicative. It is binding among participating States. National procedure — first reading, committee examination, second reading, promulgation — is organised inside that delay, not after it.
The laws to be adopted within that delay include, at minimum:
national and international defence law, including the halt of lethal production in every Class of section III, the preservation of existing stocks, the status of interception and detection capacities, and the two-per-cent reservation for remediable non-lethal technologies
a statute on electromagnetic weapons, distinguishing offensive pulse and microwave systems from protective hardening and from remediable jamming
a statute on environmental modification, geoengineering, meteorological and tectonic / seismic techniques, distinguishing open civilian science from hostile use, incorporating ENMOD as a floor, and covering hybrid explosive technologies linked with tectonic plates or faults as well as other hybrid coupling to a plate boundary
a statute on psycho-sociological and cognitive weapons, distinguishing lawful speech, education and marketing from industrialised systems designed to remove the filter of judgment of a population or a class, and covering the neurochemical, electromagnetic-neural and inductive vectors
a statute on implanted and human-borne bio-electronic devices and neuro-digital interfaces, distinguishing licensed therapeutic implants from devices configured to surveil, coerce, exfiltrate or bridge into third-party systems, and naming neutron / enhanced-radiation weapons as Type A rather than as an implant
a statute on enclosed-chamber process systems (including chemostats) and on the command of an active zone, distinguishing civilian building management and industrial fermentation from hostile actuation of a house, a block or a neighbourhood as a chamber
cybersecurity law, including the distinction between private criminal intrusion and State-directed cyber war, the threshold to be brought before the Geopolitical Court, and remediable counter-measures
research law, including prior written declaration to the State, authorisation before practical work, State responsibility for companies and laboratories on its territory, and the precautionary review of adopted projects — in biology and in the dual-use fields named in section XVIII
and the further instruments that arise from the other pillars of the Protocol — monetary recalculation, the Geopolitical Court, Interpol reform, and the sustainable economy, including taxation and concentric commercial parameters.
International instruments are negotiated and adopted on the same calendar, so that national law and international law enter into force together. A State that ratifies the Protocol accepts both the substance and the delay. Extension of the delay is possible only by the same qualified majority already provided for amendments — two thirds of UN delegations — and only for a stated reason compatible with the Protocol. Unilateral postponement is not compatible with accession.
The purpose of this rule is simple. Opposition is informed. Parliament is bound in time. Defence, electromagnetic protection, environmental-modification law, psycho-sociological protection, cybersecurity, research and the companion laws of the other pillars are not left to an open-ended debate after the Protocol has already been received.
XXIV. Disputes, reservations and final clauses
1. Disputes. Disputes on interpretation or application are settled by consultation, then by the Geopolitical Court (pillar 2), whose rulings are binding. Pending its establishment, a State may bring the dispute before the International Court of Justice by consent. 2. Reservations. No reservations are permitted to this Annex (cf. article 19(a) of the Vienna Convention, 1969). Interpretative declarations that would modify its effect are without legal effect. 3. Legal status. This Annex forms an integral part of the Global Peace Protocol. Ratification of the Protocol implies acceptance of this Annex. 4. Entry into force and provisional application. Entry into force follows section XXI, paragraph 3. States may declare provisional application (article 25 of the Vienna Convention) from signature. 5. Amendment and update of the archive. Section XXV applies. Technical lists (Classes, Types, Series and controlled inputs) may be updated by the
Conference of States Parties by a two-thirds majority; Objects are recorded by the Authority on declaration; the substantive core requires the procedure of the Protocol. 6. Review. Every five years and at fifty years (section VI). 7. Authentic texts. The six official languages of the United Nations. 8. Single accession window.22 The Protocol and its Annexes are open for signature and accession during a single accession window of 12 months from the date on which they are opened for signature. States join in one step, so that the halt of lethal production, the reconversion of industry and the recalculation of the monetary mass are carried out once and together, without repeated waves of accession that would destabilise markets. No further general accession window is opened, including at the five-yearly reviews. 9. Narrow exception. After the window closes, accession remains possible only for: (a) a State that came into existence after the window closed; or (b) a State that signed within the window and completes its constitutional procedure of ratification within 24 months of its signature. Such accession takes effect on the calendar of article 20.6, adjusted by decision of the Conference of States Parties, without reopening the window for other States. 10.States that remain outside. Any State may choose not to join the Protocol and to live in autarky. That choice is respected. A State that remains outside is nevertheless bound, under general international law, by the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State (article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations) and by the duty not to cause significant harm to the environment of other States or of areas beyond national jurisdiction. These obligations bind every State, whether or not it is a party to the Protocol. A breach of them by a non-party State may be brought
22 Choice for Andreea. The single accession window applies to accession the single-step rule already applied to the two per cent, to the Flux pilot and to the robotics chain: the market adjusts once, not in repeated waves. The proposed length of the window (12 months) is a working proposal. The narrow exception in paragraph 9 is retained only for legal credibility: without it, a State created after the window, or a State that signed in time but whose constitutional procedure was not complete, would be excluded for fifty years, which ambassadors could object to as arbitrary. It may be removed if Andreea prefers an absolute rule.
by any participating State before the competent international bodies, and before the Geopolitical Court where the non-party State consents.23
XXV. Note — the archive may receive supplementary adjustments
This list is the most complete archive that could be written for this transmission. It is not a claim that no other Class or Type exists, and it is not a claim that the archive is closed. If another State, another laboratory, another researcher or another citizen is able to update the list with a technology that this Annex has not named, the Protocol must receive that adjustment. Supplementary Classes, Types or Series, or a sharper description of one already written, may be added by the same path as this revision: written, transmitted to the missions, joined to the Protocol, and submitted to the same legislative examination. Silence of a name in this Annex is not an exemption. Absence of a name is an invitation to complete the list, not a permission to produce.
XXVI. Continuity with Annex 2
The non-lethal enforcement capacities referred to in article 20.7 and section XXI, paragraph 5 — enhanced Interpol units, their equipment of remediable effect, logistics and command — and the random rotation of surveillance missions of section I, are governed by Annex 2 (Interpol Enhancement), to be transmitted at the same time as the present updated Annex 1. This Annex sets the limit; Annex 2 sets the means.24
23 Candid note. Under article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), a treaty does not create obligations for a third State without its consent. The obligations of the Protocol and of its Annexes therefore do not bind a non-party State as treaty obligations. Paragraph 10 does not claim otherwise: it recalls obligations that already bind every State under general international law. The prohibition of the use of force (article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter) is also customary law (International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986), and the prohibition of aggression is widely recognised as a peremptory norm (jus cogens) with erga omnes effect. The duty not to cause significant transboundary environmental harm is a rule of customary law (Trail Smelter arbitration, 1938 and 1941; Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 1972; Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, 1992; International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion, 1996, paragraph 29, and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010, paragraph 101). It is not generally regarded as jus cogens, and the text does not describe it as such.
24 Correction relative to the version of 23 September 2026: Annex 2 (Interpol Enhancement) is transmitted at the same time as the present updated Annex 1, not separately at a later date.
XXVII. Why these precisions are offered now
The purpose is to avoid two opposite misunderstandings: that the Protocol would leave nations without any reserve; and that it would convert every military site or every stock into something else. Neither is the case.
Lethal production stops. Existing heavy arsenal and existing munitions are kept, except where a Type — biological weapons, hostile environmental modification, irreversible psycho-sociological weapons, implanted hybrid devices configured as weapons — is incompatible with the very idea of a reserve. Interception and detection capacities are distinguished from existing defensive stocks; new production of those capacities is treated as heavy arsenal and should absorb the last symbolic production run. A limited, certified, non-biological two per cent continues. Biological, lethal chemical, radiological, offensive electromagnetic, meteorological / geoengineering, psycho-sociological / cognitive, neutron / enhanced-radiation, and implanted hybrid bio-electronic means stay outside that two per cent. Cyber harm, electromagnetic harm, environmental harm, cognitive harm and implant-bridge harm to civil life are each named as what they are, and are brought to the Court when a State is behind them.
The further purpose of this revision is narrower and frank. An annex that names firearms, bombs, missiles and nuclear weapons, and then says “comparable platforms”, leaves too much room for a ministry to claim that an electromagnetic pulse, a high-power microwave, a weather programme, a psycho-sociological programme against a class, a neutron warhead, or a human-borne hybrid device used as a bridge into another machine, is something else. It is not something else. Neutron radiation is not an implant. An implant is not a neutron. Both are inside the pillar. That is now written.
The list may be completed. The halt of lethal production does not wait for the last name.
I remain available for any clarification. The Global Peace Protocol of 30 July 2025 is attached again for ease of reference.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Andreea Talpeanu
Romanian activist for peace and the environment
7 rue Jarry, 75010 Paris, France
a.talpeanu@gmail.com
andreea.talpeanu.peace@proton.me
+33 7 51 48 44 21
26 October 2026
Annex 1 of 5 — replaces the communication of 23 September 2026. Pillars remain equal. Production stops. Stocks remain. The list is the present archive and may be completed.
Previous text
Annex 1 of 5 — the text kept below
The text that follows is the annex as it stood before the revision of 26 October 2026. It remains here, under the new text, so that both may be read.
Stop Weapons Industry
Annex 1 of 5 · exhaustive classification
Excellencies, Dear Ambassadors, Dear Members of the Permanent Missions, REVISED TEXT — This communication replaces Annex 1 of 5 dated 22 September 2026. The substance of the pillar is unchanged. What was missing, and is now supplied in full, is the archive of the major families of weapons to which the halt of lethal production applies. Families that had been left to implication are now written: electromagnetic weapons; environmental-modification / geoengineering / meteorological weapons; psycho-sociological / cognitive weapons; neutron irradiation / enhanced radiation inside family A; and implanted hybrid bio-electronic / neuro-digital devices when configured as weapons. None of these is folded into “cyber” by default.
I hope this message finds you well.
Note of support. This revised annex was elaborated with the assistance of Grok, an artificial-intelligence system built by xAI, as a working archive of weapon families for legislative examination. That support is for the classification: that the families be named, distinguished, and left open to later adjustment. It is not a political endorsement of any State, any alliance, or any government in office. Responsibility for the Protocol remains with its initiator.
This communication is Annex 1 of 5. Each Annex addresses one of the five pillars of the Global Peace Protocol dated 30 July 2025. The five pillars — Monetary Recalculation, the Geopolitical Court, Interpol Reform, Stop Weapons Industry, and Sustainable Economy — operate in synergy; none stands above the others.
The Protocol was received by postal mail at the Permanent Missions of China (21 July 2026), France (22 July 2026), the United States (22 July 2026) and Ireland (10 August 2026). It has since been transmitted by electronic mail to all 193 UN Member State delegations, to the ministries of foreign affairs of a small number of countries not represented at the United Nations, and to NATO. The European Bank responded positively and indicated that the text would be taken into consideration. The BRICS Bank received the Protocol by postal service. The World Bank did not accept delivery: the parcel was returned after one year, and the electronic message could not be delivered for lack of a working address in the available contact list.
I. Precisions on the conditions for stopping warfare production
The Protocol stops new lethal production. It does not empty national defence.
Nothing in the Protocol requires any State to renounce a military alliance. Existing arsenals remain untouched. They are neither destroyed nor reconverted. Existing stocks of munitions likewise remain intact and are preserved as national defence reserves. Sites that store munitions are not demolished and are not reconverted. They are kept so that they may be reactivated if needed.
These storage sites are placed under foreign surveillance by military missions of States that either have no military-industrial sites on their territory or that, under the Protocol, undertake to renounce weapons industry entirely.
What stops, by the agreed and gradual phases already described in the Protocol, is the production of lethal systems — in every family listed in section II — and the production of the munitions those systems consume. Stopping production is not the same as destroying stocks. Depots stay. Lines of lethal manufacture close.
The audit provided in the Protocol concerns production facilities and supply chains, not existing arsenals, which remain at the free disposal of national strategy. The inventory of existing arsenals must nevertheless be declared and made transparent among all States that accept the Protocol. Stockpiles of munitions and heavy weapons must be protected: first, by rotating foreign surveillance drawn from States that themselves hold no such industrial base; second, by the rotating direction of Interpol provided for in the Protocol; and third, by a permanent national interception shield against missiles or other unauthorised dangerous sources within the security perimeter.
Closure of a production line does not mean demolition of every military installation. Barracks, command structures, training grounds and storage sites are not the object of the 98 per cent measure.
The working definition used throughout this Annex is the definition already given by the Protocol: a lethal arm is any technology designed to cause irreversible harm or death. That definition is not limited to firearms, explosives, missiles and nuclear weapons. Those four were examples. They were never an exhaustive list. The present revision states the list.
II. Exhaustive archive of the major families of weapons
The halt of lethal production applies to every family below. The archive is organised by effect and by industrial line, not by marketing name or by the ministry that holds the budget. A system belongs to a family by what it is built to do, not by the word printed on the crate. Where a platform is dual-use, the configuration and the assigned mission decide.
This archive does not teach construction. It classifies. Classification is what a protocol owes to those who must legislate.
| Family | What the halt covers | Stocks | Two per cent | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Nuclear and enhanced-radiation | Nuclear-capable strike systems, including neutron irradiation, enhanced-radiation systems and neutron warheads. New production halted. | Declared, kept, under foreign rotating surveillance. | No. The last symbolic run may not add warheads or offensive nuclear or neutron delivery. | Neutron weapons are not a slogan. They are radiation. They are family A. See the reading of A–D. |
| B. Chemical weapons | Lethal and classic chemical weapons. Production halted. | Declared; not reconverted, except a narrow certified subset after independent verification. | No, except incapacitants whose effect is remediable. | Same logic as biological weapons. |
| C. Biological and toxin weapons | Production, stockpiling for hostile use, and hidden development prohibited. | Incompatible with the Protocol. Not a reserve. | No. Never. | Prior written declaration before any practical research with bioweapon potential. |
| D. Radiological weapons and area-contamination devices | Production halted. | Declared; not reconverted. | No. | Effects are not remediable in the sense of the Protocol. |
| E. Conventional land systems and land munitions | Combat vehicles, artillery, mortars, MLRS, anti-tank systems, mines, cluster munitions, small arms and light weapons destined for combat, and industrial explosive fill. | Declared and kept as a national defence reserve. | No for lethal lines. Police replacement only via certified remediable tools. | Closure of lines, not demolition of barracks or depots. |
| F. Air combat systems and aerial munitions | Combat aircraft, attack helicopters, strike UAVs, bombs, and air-to-ground and air-to-air lethal stores. | Declared and kept. | No. | Interceptors and sensors are treated separately (section IV). |
| G. Naval combat systems and naval munitions | Strike combatants configured for lethal sea or land attack, naval missiles, torpedoes, naval mines, and shipborne strike aviation. | Declared and kept. | No. | Coast-guard and rescue platforms are not the object of the 98 per cent measure. |
| H. Missile, rocket and hypersonic strike systems | Ballistic, cruise, hypersonic glide and boost-glide, anti-ship, land-attack, and comparable offensive missiles and their industrial munitions. | Declared and kept. | No. | Missile-defence interceptors: last symbolic run (section IV). |
| I. Directed-energy weapons of irreversible effect | Weaponised high-energy lasers and comparable beams designed to destroy persons, platforms or critical civil plant. | Declared if held. | No, unless independently certified remediable and non-destructive. | Distinct from rangefinders and ordinary sensors. |
| J. Electromagnetic weapons | Offensive electromagnetic pulse, high-power microwave, and hostile radio-frequency systems designed to disable or destroy persons, electronics, grids, or medical, energy and water systems. | Declared if held. | No where the effect is not remediable. | Not absorbed into “cyber”. Own family. See section VIII. |
| K. Acoustic and infrasonic weapons of irreversible effect | Systems designed to cause permanent injury or death by sound or pressure. | Declared if held. | No. | Temporary, medically reversible acoustic tools may be examined for the two per cent. |
| L. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) | Systems that select and apply lethal force without meaningful human control. | Declared if held; no new production. | No. | Autonomy in interception and detection remains subject to human authorisation. |
| M. Space weapons and destructive counter-space systems | Kinetic anti-satellite interceptors, co-orbital destructive devices, debris-generating weapons, and nuclear or directed-energy weapons based in or transiting space for hostile use. | Declared if held. | No. | Space-situational-awareness sensors and non-destructive collision avoidance are not weapons. |
| N. Environmental, geoengineering, meteorological and tectonic weapons | Hostile weather; drought or heating used as a weapon; induced seismic or oceanic disturbance; hybrid explosive technologies linked with tectonic plates or faults (conventional, nuclear, or irradiation); other hybrid coupling to a plate boundary; any hostile environmental-modification technique. | Incompatible with a reserve. It is not kept as national defence stock. | No. Never. | ENMOD 1977 is the floor, not the ceiling. Own family. See section IX. |
| O. Incendiary, thermobaric and fuel-air systems | Systems designed to kill or destroy by fire, overpressure or oxygen depletion in a populated or civil setting. | Declared and kept only if already held as conventional stock; no new production. | No. | Industrial demolition charges under civil licence are not this family. |
| P. Dual-use industrial lines configured as weapons | A civilian line becomes a weapons line when it is organised, funded or tasked to produce a system in families A–O, Q, R or S. | Configuration, not the factory building, is the object of the halt. | Only if the output itself is remediable and certified. | Declaration rule of section XIII applies. |
| Q. Psycho-sociological weapons (psycho-hacking) | Systems designed to alter impulse, memory or the collective behaviour of a person, a population or a social class by neurochemical action, by electromagnetic action on neural activity, or by mass inductive information without a remediable off-switch. | Incompatible with a reserve where the effect is irreversible. Not stored “in case”. | No. Never, where the effect is not remediable under the forty-eight-hour standard. | Not a metaphor. Not absorbed into cyber, chemistry or marketing. Own family. See section X. |
| R. Implanted hybrid bio-electronic and neuro-digital weapons | Human-borne micro-devices — electronic, thermal-recharge, auditory, optical or other — configured to surveil, to coerce, to exfiltrate, or to serve as a bridge into a third-party system, including an implant reacted under neutron irradiation. | Incompatible with a reserve where the device is a weapon. | No, where the effect is not remediable. | Not a neutron. Not “only cyber”. Own family. See section XI. Medical implants remain medical until configured as weapons. |
| S. Enclosed-chamber systems and the active zone | Chemostats and other enclosed-chamber chemical or biological process devices configured as a weapons line, and hostile command of an active zone — a house, a block, a neighbourhood or any delimited inhabited volume — to deliver, hold or lock an effect on those inside. | Incompatible with a reserve where the zone itself is the weapon. | No. Never, where the effect on inhabitants is not remediable. | Not “only chemistry”, and not “only a smart building”. Civilian chemostats remain civilian until tasked as weapons. |
The nineteen families are the object of the 98 per cent measure wherever the output is lethal or non-remediable. Sub-variants, national designations and future names that perform the same function fall inside the same family. Silence of a trade name in this Annex is not an exemption.
III. Reading the families without reducing them to four examples
A–D. Weapons of mass effect
Nuclear explosive devices, and the industrial production of warheads and of delivery systems built to carry them, remain inside the halt. Chemical agents whose effects are not remediable, biological and toxin agents, and radiological devices — including any device whose purpose is the contamination of territory or of a water or food system by radioactive material — remain outside the two per cent. They are not “non-lethal tools” under another name. Hostile neutron irradiation belongs to family A. It is radiation. They are not a civilian “neutron application” and they are not an implanted micro-device. Sections VI and VII restate the research and certification rules for chemical and biological lines.
E–H. Conventional kinetic industry
The conventional families cover the industrial production of combat platforms and of the munitions they consume on land, in the air and at sea: small arms and light weapons destined for combat; artillery, mortars and multiple-launch rocket systems; armoured fighting vehicles; anti-tank and anti-structure systems; landmines and cluster munitions; combat aircraft and attack helicopters; armed remotely piloted aircraft used as strike platforms; bombs and air-delivered stores; surface combatants and submarines configured for lethal strike; torpedoes and naval mines; and the full missile spectrum — ballistic, cruise, hypersonic, anti-ship, land-attack and comparable offensive rockets. Existing platforms already in national stocks stay. New lines close.
I–K. Energy, electromagnetic and acoustic weapons
Directed-energy systems designed to destroy persons, platforms or civil plant; electromagnetic pulse, high-power microwave and hostile radio-frequency systems; and acoustic or infrasonic systems designed for irreversible injury or death, are each a family of their own. Electromagnetic weapons are not a chapter of cyber operations. A reversible software measure that can be lifted, leaving the machine intact, is one thing. A pulse or a microwave burst that burns a grid, a hospital wing or a flight computer is another. The Protocol treats them as different objects. Section VIII is devoted to the electromagnetic family.
L–M. Autonomy and space
Lethal autonomous weapons systems — systems that select and apply lethal force without meaningful human control — are inside the halt. Autonomy used only to detect, track or recommend, with a human authorisation before force, is not the same object; it remains subject to the interception rules of section IV and to the Court if abused. Destructive space weapons and debris-generating counter-space systems are inside the halt. Sensors for space situational awareness, and non-destructive collision-avoidance manoeuvres, are not.
N. Environmental modification, geoengineering and meteorological weapons
This family was omitted from the examples of 22 September 2026. That omission is corrected here and is developed in section IX. Hostile modification of weather, climate, precipitation, the ionosphere, seismic or tectonic conditions, oceanic conditions, or of any other environmental process, in order to harm a population, a harvest, a water cycle or a territory, is a weapon. It is not a civilian science programme under another letterhead. It does not enter the two per cent. It is not kept as a “reserve”. The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) is the floor of the obligation, not the ceiling.
O–P. Incendiary systems and dual-use configuration
Incendiary, thermobaric and fuel-air systems designed to kill or to destroy by fire, overpressure or oxygen depletion remain inside the halt of new production. A civilian industrial line — chemicals, aerospace, satellites, meteorology, high-energy physics, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, agriculture — becomes a weapons line when it is organised, funded or tasked to produce a system in families A to O, Q or R. The building may stay. The configuration as a weapons line closes.
Q. Psycho-sociological and cognitive weapons
This family was omitted from the first revision. It is not a figure of speech. A weapon that leaves buildings standing and still removes from a person, a class or a people the capacity to judge, to refuse, or to recover a prior state of mind, is a weapon of mass effect. It may arrive as a chemical load on neurotransmission; as an electromagnetic load on neural activity; or as a patterned inductive signal in the information environment. Where those three vectors are combined, the damage is still one family. Section X is devoted to it. It is not folded into chemistry, into electromagnetics, or into cyber.
R. Implanted hybrid bio-electronic and neuro-digital weapons
A device placed in or on the body — a micro-circuit, a thermal-recharge implant, an auditory or optical micro-system, a neuro-digital interface — becomes a weapon when it is organised, funded or tasked to surveil without lawful cause, to coerce, to extract a stream of information (a fuite / exfiltration), or to serve as a bridge into another digital system. That object is family R. The implant may react under neutron irradiation. Neutrons are radiation. An implant is an object. Conflating the two would let a ministry hide either. Section XI is devoted to family R.
S. Enclosed-chamber process systems and the active zone
A chemostat is a continuous enclosed-chamber process device. In civilian use it holds a biological or chemical culture at a steady state. It becomes a weapons line when it is organised, funded or tasked to produce or to hold a hostile agent in a chamber. The same logic applies when the chamber is no longer a laboratory vessel but an active zone: a house, a block, a neighbourhood, or any delimited inhabited volume whose climate, air, access or sensors can be commanded, used to deliver, to hold or to lock an effect on those inside. The object is the active zone. It cannot hide as “building management”. Families B, C, P and cyber may all be engaged.
IV. Interception and detection capabilities
A last symbolic production run for national defence reserves remains possible, as the Protocol already states, so that States retain flexibility during the transition. That run should be concentrated on interception and detection, not on new offensive platforms.
Radar, missile-defence shields, detection networks and cyber-jamming used to intercept incoming threats are classified as arsenal of interception. They are not treated as identical to the existing defensive arsenal already in stock. Existing defensive stocks remain as they are. Fresh production of interception and detection systems is, however, treated as heavy arsenal. The last symbolic production run authorised by the Protocol should therefore be directed mainly toward interception and detection capacities, not toward new offensive systems.
Hardening of hospitals, water, energy and food systems against electromagnetic pulse and against hostile radio-frequency attack may form part of the same interception effort. Hardening is protection. It is not a licence to build an offensive electromagnetic weapon under a defensive name.
After ratification, participating States establish agreed plans for the closure of lethal production sites in every family of section II.
V. The two per cent reserved for non-lethal technologies
The Protocol retains two per cent of industrial capacity for non-lethal technologies whose side effects are remediable. Production is to be maintained at a stable and sufficient steady volume for fifty years — the period after which the Protocol is to be renewed on the same conditions, or amended by a two-thirds vote of UN delegations — and is to include the progressive replacement of national police arsenals.
Civilian weapons-recovery and buy-back programmes, with incentive campaigns for sale into national reserves, remain part of the same pillar. National police arsenals, and weapons later recovered from civilian circulation, will progressively pass, by common agreement, to the military defensive forces; or, in criminal cases linked to arms trafficking, they will be absorbed under the same framework. Any progressive increase of the national defensive reserve must be declared in a common database of shared arsenal inventories, while remaining in the custody and at the charge of each national reserve.
In the absence of precise data on how many States will accept the Protocol, and in the absence of a fully reinforced Interpol equipped with non-lethal weapons of reversible effect and of an international security cooperation among such units, the figure of two per cent remains a working proposition, not a final ceiling.
Reference note — a realistic upper illustration
Switzerland offers a useful reference for scale. It combines a strong security position (armed neutrality, militia service, high readiness) with one of the highest civilian firearm densities among stable democracies: on the order of 27.6 civilian firearms per 100 residents (Small Arms Survey estimates), together with very low firearm homicide.
That density is not proposed as a target. It is proposed only as an upper illustrative bound when calculating a realistic maximum share of industrial reconversion toward non-lethal weapons with reversible effects, pending better data on accession and on Interpol’s non-lethal capacity. A two-per-cent industrial reservation remains, on present information, a conservative working figure beneath that illustrative bound.
That two per cent is not biological. It is not radiological. It is not a meteorological weapon. It is not an electromagnetic pulse against a grid. It is not a psycho-sociological weapon against a class. It is not a neutron-irradiation weapon. It is not an implanted hybrid device configured as a weapon. The technologies contemplated are chemico-mechanical or mechanical and, where appropriate, cyber tools used with remediable effect. Examples of remediable cyber tools include: reversible encryption or reversible obfuscation of a system that can be lifted without permanent destruction; temporary withholding of access with cached restoration; time-limited electromagnetic or RF jamming that ceases when emission stops and leaves the underlying system intact; and non-kinetic seizure of an unauthorised drone for a controlled landing rather than its destruction. In every case the requirement is the same: the effect must be remediable, not permanent. The Protocol already gives as orientation temporary disorientation reversible by medical care within forty-eight hours. That standard remains the reference.
Workers displaced from lethal production — on the order of ten million persons worldwide — receive transitional support and retraining toward sustainable fields, financed by the budgets freed by the halt of lethal manufacture and new substantial finance which comes with the other pillar — the recalculation of the monetary mass. Industrial conversion, where it occurs, is a conversion of output and of labour, not a demolition of every site. Common votes of UN nations are organised for the reconversion of sites in light of eventual chains of production and distribution of non-lethal systems, but production remains a national responsibility. From the military forces of national defence, or from common alliances, part of the personnel may be partially reconverted to Interpol missions equipped with non-lethal weapons.
VI. Biological weapons
Biological weapons do not enter the two per cent. They are not reconverted into “non-lethal” tools. Their use and their hidden development remain incompatible with the Protocol.
A complementary rule is proposed for research, as a conjunctive aspect of this pillar and, in due course, of the Charter discussion.
What is required is to declare first to one’s own State — and, as a company or laboratory, on paper — the nature of the research, the interests for society, and the working hypotheses. Only after that declaration, and after agreement of the competent national authority, may practical fundamental research begin. In that case the State is fully responsible for the production of national companies, or of any multinational congregation conducting medical research on its territory, including research on animals — domestic, industrial, or anywhere in a trophic chain — where a bioweapon potential exists. Researchers remain professionally responsible for adopted projects, which may be reconsidered or judged even after fifty years, or earlier, under the precautionary principle or in light of adopted diffusion.
They handle highly elaborate components. Intuition must be stated first, examined and supervised, before practice. First the theoretical file, then the practical work. That sequence is proposed as an international standard of transparency, not as an invitation to clandestine programmes.
VII. Chemical and radiological weapons
Lethal chemical agents — those whose effects are not remediable — are excluded from the two per cent, in the same logic as biological weapons.
A narrower category of incapacitating chemical means, if and only if their effects are genuinely remediable under independent verification, may be examined for possible inclusion in the two per cent. That examination would take place under international certification. It does not reopen the door to classic lethal chemical arsenals.
Radiological devices, including the contamination of territory by radioactive material, do not belong in the two per cent. Their effects are not remediable in the sense of the Protocol. They remain on the prohibited side, together with nuclear weapons already covered by the Protocol’s definition of lethal arms.
VIII. Electromagnetic weapons — a family of their own
Electromagnetic weapons are not cyber tools. They are not “an annex of the internet”. They act on matter and on circuits by energy delivered in the electromagnetic spectrum. They can stop a hospital, a pumping station, an aircraft’s flight controls or a city’s lighting without a single file being opened. For that reason they occupy their own line in the archive.
The family includes, without being limited to: nuclear and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse devices designed as weapons; high-power microwave systems designed to disable or destroy persons or electronics; and hostile radio-frequency systems whose intended effect is irreversible injury, death, or the lasting destruction of civil infrastructure. The family does not include ordinary communications, navigation, radar used as a sensor, or time-limited jamming that ceases when emission stops and leaves the underlying system intact.
Offensive electromagnetic weapons fall under the halt of lethal production. Their effects on civil life — energy, water, food cold-chain, transport, hospitals, laboratories — are in most configurations not remediable within the forty-eight-hour medical standard, nor remediable as a system that can simply be “switched back on”. Burnt transformers, destroyed flight computers and lost medical devices are not a reversible encryption. They therefore do not enter the two per cent.
A State-directed electromagnetic attack against the civil systems of another State is an act to be declared to the Geopolitical Court, in the same way as a cyber war or an economic aggression. The answer remains non-lethal: a binding ruling, isolation where necessary, reparations, remediable counter-measures. It is not a return to kinetic retaliation.
Protective hardening of critical civil systems against electromagnetic attack may be part of the interception arsenal of section IV. The distinction is the same as everywhere in this pillar: the shield may be strengthened; the offensive line closes.
IX. Environmental modification, geoengineering and meteorological weapons — a family of their own
Weather is not a neutral background of war. It is, when forced for hostile purpose, a weapon. The Protocol therefore names this family instead of leaving it under “comparable platforms” or under cyber. Tectonic plates and faults are part of the same family. They are not a metaphor and they are not an implant.
The family includes any technique that modifies, through deliberate human action, the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth — including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere and space — when that technique is used for military or any other hostile purpose. The examples that must be stated, because they have been studied as weapons and because they are easily hidden inside civilian programmes, are these: hostile weather modification; forced precipitation or forced drought over a territory or a harvest; manipulation of storms or of temperature as a means of pressure or of harm; ionospheric heating used to disrupt communications, navigation or populations rather than to study the upper atmosphere; induced or attempted seismic, volcanic or oceanic disturbance; and large-scale geoengineering deployed as a means of coercion — including solar-radiation management or carbon-cycle intervention used to harm, to blackmail or to starve, rather than under an open civilian mandate subject to the Court.
Civilian meteorology, civilian climate science, civilian disaster prevention and open geoengineering research conducted for the protection of the climate are not, by that fact alone, weapons. They become a weapons line when they are organised, funded or tasked to produce a hostile effect of the kind just named. The declaration rule of section XIII applies to them with the same severity as to biological research: first the theoretical file, addressed to one’s own State, stating the nature of the work, the interest for society and the working hypotheses; only then, and only with the agreement of the competent national authority, the practical work. The State remains responsible for companies, laboratories and multinational congregations on its territory.
Tectonic plates, faults, and hybrid explosive technologies
The lithosphere is named because it can otherwise be left out of “weather”. A hostile attempt to induce, steer, accelerate or hold an earthquake, a tremor sequence, a landslide, a volcanic pulse or a tsunamigenic displacement belongs to family N. So does a distinct object that must be written in full: hybrid explosive technologies linked with tectonic plates or with faults. That object is an explosive line — conventional high explosive, nuclear explosive, or irradiation explosive — organised, funded or tasked to act on a plate boundary, a fault, a volcanic edifice or a submarine slope, so that the explosion is not the whole event and the Earth system is used as the rest of the weapon. The Understandings annexed to ENMOD already list earthquakes. The Protocol takes that list as a floor and names the hybrid explosive case so that a ministry cannot call the charge “only munitions” and the plate “only geology”. The charge remains family E or family A. The coupling to the plate is family N. Both close.
Civilian seismology, tsunami warning, volcanic monitoring and the study of plate tectonics are not weapons. Reservoirs, mining, geothermal work and injection wells can induce local seismicity; they become a weapons line when they are organised, funded or tasked to produce a hostile tectonic or seismic effect. The declaration rule of section XIII applies. This Annex does not describe how a fault would be forced. Classification is the duty. A tectonic or seismic weapon is not a reserve. Its effects on cities, on coasts and on the plate itself are not remediable inside forty-eight hours.
ENMOD already binds a large number of States. The Protocol does not weaken ENMOD. It extends the same logic into the industrial halt, into the audit of production sites and supply chains, into the Geopolitical Court, and into the fifty-year review. A meteorological or geoengineering weapon is not a reserve. It is not stored “in case”. It is not part of the two per cent. Its effects on harvests, on water, on habitat and on the climate system are not remediable inside forty-eight hours, and often not remediable at all inside a human generation.
A State-directed hostile use of environmental modification against another State, or against a population, is to be declared to the Geopolitical Court. The answer is the Court’s answer: ruling, isolation where necessary, reparations, remediable counter-measures. Not a climate war in return.
X. Psycho-sociological and cognitive weapons — psycho-hacking, a family of their own
A society can be damaged without a crater. The Protocol therefore names a family that acts on judgment, on impulse, on memory and on the common capacity of a population or of a social class to refuse an order that would harm. Military writing already uses neighbouring words — psychological operations, cognitive warfare, influence operations. Those words are too soft when the intended effect is irreversible. This Annex uses a harder name: psycho-sociological weapons. The popular name psycho-hacking is accepted as a designation of the same family. A “psycho-virus” in this text is not a metaphor for a rumour. It is a designed agent or a designed signal whose purpose is to occupy, lock or overload neural or social processing so that a person or a class remains fixed on one impulse and cannot recover the filter of conscience within the remediable standard of the Protocol.
Three vectors, one family
The family has three vectors. They may be used alone. They may be used together. Together does not create a fourth family; it aggravates the first.
First vector — neurochemical. An agent that acts on neurotransmission, or that deposits in nervous tissue a persistent toxic load, is a chemical weapon when it poisons the body. It is also, when the intended target is judgment or the behaviour of a class, a psycho-sociological weapon. Persistent metallic and other neurotoxic loads belong here when they are introduced as a weapon or as a dual-use product line configured as a weapon. Aluminium is named because it is a documented neurotoxicant at sufficient load, because a large fraction of a deposited load is not rapidly excreted, and because a ministry could otherwise pretend that a neurotoxic campaign is only “chemistry” or only “public health”. Naming the metal is not a licence to treat every civilian medical use of an aluminium compound as an act of war. Configuration and intent decide, as everywhere in this pillar. Where the load is not remediable inside the forty-eight-hour standard — and a persistent tissue deposit is not — the line is outside the two per cent.
Second vector — electromagnetic action on neural activity. Family J already covers offensive electromagnetic pulse and high-power microwave against bodies and against infrastructure. This second vector is narrower and is not absorbed by family J: a radio-frequency or other electromagnetic emission designed not to burn a transformer but to occupy, lock or overload neural activity, so that a brain remains fixed on one information or one impulse. Long-wave and other radio emissions are named as a field of concern, not as an instruction. Ordinary broadcasting, navigation and medical imaging are not this vector. An emission becomes this vector when it is organised, funded or tasked to produce a non-remediable cognitive effect. Protective shielding of hospitals, schools and dwellings against such an emission may form part of the interception arsenal of section IV. The offensive line closes.
Third vector — mass inductive information without a remediable off-switch. Advertising, speech, art and political campaigning are not weapons by the fact that they persuade. They become this vector when they are industrialised as a system designed to remove the psychological filter of a population or of a class — to fix an impulse to consume past refusal, or, worse, an impulse to harm — and when that fixation is not remediable by ordinary contradiction, education or the passage of forty-eight hours. A private fraud remains a crime for Interpol. A State-directed or State-tolerated system that uses this vector against a population or a class is to be declared to the Geopolitical Court.
The three vectors are most dangerous when they are stacked: a chemical load that reduces the filter of conscience, an electromagnetic load that holds one information in place, and an inductive campaign that tells the held information what to do. Stacking does not move the object into cyber. It remains family Q.
What this family is not
This family is not a verdict on any particular civilian vaccination campaign, nor a finding that a licensed medical product already administered is, by that fact, a weapon. Medical products, adjuvants and delivery systems are dual-use. They fall under family P and under the declaration rule of section XIII when they are organised, funded or tasked to introduce a persistent neuro-active or neurotoxic load as a weapon, or to prepare a class for the second or third vector. Open therapeutic research, declared to the State, authorised, and conducted for the health of the person, remains research. Hidden development of a cognitive weapon inside a health programme is incompatible with the Protocol, in the same way as hidden biological development.
This family is also not a ban on education, liturgy, journalism or lawful marketing. The test is the test of the whole pillar: is the system designed to cause irreversible harm — here, irreversible harm to judgment, to bodily nervous integrity, or to the capacity of a class to refuse harm — and is the effect remediable? If the effect is not remediable, production stops. The two per cent does not receive it.
A State-directed psycho-sociological attack against a population or a social class is to be declared to the Geopolitical Court. The answer remains the Court’s answer: ruling, isolation where necessary, reparations, remediable counter-measures. It is not a return to kinetic retaliation, and it is not a return to a cognitive war in the other direction.
XI. Implanted hybrid bio-electronic and neuro-digital weapons — and neutron irradiation
The implant is named here. Hostile neutron irradiation is named here. The implant can be the object that reacts under a neutron-irradiation attack.
Neutron irradiation — radiation, not a slogan
Hostile neutron irradiation — enhanced radiation delivered to kill, to disable, or to act on a living body or on a device in that body — is family A. It is radiation. New production of systems designed for that irradiation stops. Because focalised irradiation can kill individually, those means require deep surveillance: declaration, foreign rotating watch where they are held, and protection of the medical data that would make a body map precise. Existing means, if any are held, are declared with the nuclear and radiological inventory. Civilian neutron applications — radiography, industrial gauging, licensed nuclear medicine — are not weapons by that fact. They become a weapons line when they are organised, funded or tasked to produce a hostile irradiation effect, or to feed family A. They then fall under family P and under the declaration rule of section XIII. This Annex does not describe how such irradiation is produced.
The implant reacted under neutron irradiation
A human-borne micro-device — electronic, thermal-recharge, auditory, optical, or a neuro-digital interface — can be configured as a weapon in its own right: to watch, to coerce, to extract a stream of information (a fuite), or to serve as a bridge into a third-party digital system. That is family R.
The same implant can also be the object that reacts under a neutron-irradiation attack: altered, jammed, erased, or forced by radiation so that the device, the person, or a system linked to the person is harmed or opened. The danger is not only collective. Hostile neutron irradiation that is focalised on very specific points of a precise body map can kill or disable a person individually. For that reason the means that produce or direct such irradiation cannot stand without deep surveillance. A hack of medical data — hospital files, imaging, scans, anatomical maps, implant registers — can be linked to a hard irradiation attack: the map tells where to focalise; the irradiation is the strike. Theft or covert use of those files is therefore not only a privacy crime. When it is organised to prepare or to aim an irradiation attack, it engages family R, family A and family XII (cyber) together. Medical data of the body map must be treated as a protected object of this pillar. This Annex does not describe how irradiation is focalised. In that case the irradiation is family A and the implant is family R. The hybrid is both. A ministry may not call the event “only radiation” and hide the implant, nor call it “only a medical device” and hide the irradiation. If the reacted implant is then used as a bridge into another digital system, family XII (cyber) is also engaged.
Consent obtained under exploitation is not consent. A person who “approves” an implant because a position, a care pathway or a threat leaves no real refusal has not authorised a weapons line. The State remains responsible for companies and congregations that place such devices on its territory.
Licensed therapeutic implants — pacemakers, cochlear devices, declared neuro-prostheses — remain medical so long as they are organised for the health of the person, declared, and not tasked to surveil, to coerce, to exfiltrate, to bridge, or to serve as the coupling surface of an irradiation attack. Hidden development of a human-borne weapons interface inside a health or “wellness” programme is incompatible with the Protocol.
Family R does not enter the two per cent where the effect is not remediable. Protective detection of unauthorised implants, and the lawful removal of a device that is a weapon, may form part of the interception effort of section IV. The offensive line closes.
A State-directed use of implanted devices, or of neutron irradiation against an implant or against the person who carries it, is to be declared to the Geopolitical Court. The answer remains the Court’s answer. It is not a return to kinetic retaliation.
XII. Cyber tools, cybercrime and cyber war
Cyber tools with remediable effect may belong to the two per cent: a capacity that interrupts a system and can then be lifted, leaving no permanent destruction, is consistent with the reversible logic of the pillar.
A lone or private intrusion remains a crime. It is not an act of war. It is a matter for enhanced Interpol, in international collaboration, under criminal law.
A cyber operation supported or directed by a State is another matter. It is not “only a missing file” and it is not only a blocked server. It can strike civil life directly: hospitals and medical security; energy; water and food supply; transport; financial systems; and biological security, including laboratories and health databases. When those effects are produced by a State against another State, the situation is already a form of war — a cyber war — comparable in nature to an economic war. It is not a war only on paper.
Such a situation must be declared to the Geopolitical Court provided by the Protocol, in the same way as a territorial dispute, an economic aggression, an electromagnetic attack, a hostile environmental modification, or any other conflict that a community or a State cannot settle by ordinary means. The Protocol insists on the Court. The answer remains non-lethal: a binding ruling, isolation where necessary, reparations, remediable counter-measures. It is not a return to kinetic retaliation.
There is at present no complete international instrument that draws the line between a criminal intrusion and an act of cyber war. It is therefore proposed that participating States adopt, in the same protocol space and by parliamentary process, an international law setting that threshold — adopted together with the sustainability instruments already contemplated in the fifth pillar (taxation and the law of concentric commercial parameters). Random private actors remain under criminal law. A State that supports the attack is already in a situation of war and must answer before the Court.
Electromagnetic weapons, meteorological weapons, psycho-sociological weapons, neutron weapons and implanted hybrid devices are cited in this section only to mark the border. They are not absorbed by it. An implant used as a bridge into a third-party system engages family R and this family together.
XIII. Declaration rule for dual-use research beyond biology
The sequence already stated for biological research — theoretical file first, national declaration, authorisation, then practical work — is extended, as a conjunctive rule of this pillar, to any research programme that carries a credible potential to become a system in families I, J, N, Q or R, and to neutron applications capable of feeding family A: directed energy of destructive intensity; electromagnetic pulse or high-power microwave of hostile effect; environmental modification / geoengineering / meteorological techniques capable of hostile use; psycho-sociological or cognitive techniques capable of non-remediable effect on judgment, impulse or the behaviour of a class; implanted or human-borne bio-electronic and neuro-digital interfaces configured to surveil, coerce, exfiltrate or bridge; and neutron-generating or enhanced-radiation work beyond an authorised civilian mandate.
The State is responsible for the companies, laboratories and multinational congregations on its territory. Researchers remain professionally responsible for adopted projects, which may be reconsidered or judged even after fifty years, or earlier, under the precautionary principle or in light of adopted diffusion. The sequence is an international standard of transparency. It is not an invitation to clandestine programmes.
XIV. Submission to political opposition and binding timetable for legislative adoption
The Protocol is not submitted only to the government in office. It must be transmitted, with a precise agenda, to the political opposition in each participating State, so that adoption is a national act and not the act of a single majority.
Transmission to the opposition takes place at the same time as transmission to the executive and to parliament, or within a short, fixed interval set in the agenda annexed to the Protocol. The opposition receives the full text, the five pillars, the draft national and international instruments, and the calendar of votes. Silence or absence of the opposition does not suspend the calendar; it does not enlarge it either.
The delay for resolution and for the adoption of the laws that accompany the Protocol is strict. It follows the timetable already contained in the Protocol. That timetable is not indicative. It is binding among participating States. National procedure — first reading, committee examination, second reading, promulgation — is organised inside that delay, not after it.
The laws to be adopted within that delay include, at minimum:
- national and international defence law, including the halt of lethal production in every family of section II, the preservation of existing stocks, the status of interception and detection capacities, and the two-per-cent reservation for remediable non-lethal technologies
- a statute on electromagnetic weapons, distinguishing offensive pulse and microwave systems from protective hardening and from remediable jamming
- a statute on environmental modification, geoengineering, meteorological and tectonic / seismic techniques, distinguishing open civilian science from hostile use, incorporating ENMOD as a floor, and covering hybrid explosive technologies linked with tectonic plates or faults as well as other hybrid coupling to a plate boundary
- a statute on psycho-sociological and cognitive weapons, distinguishing lawful speech, education and marketing from industrialised systems designed to remove the filter of judgment of a population or a class, and covering the neurochemical, electromagnetic-neural and inductive vectors
- a statute on implanted and human-borne bio-electronic devices and neuro-digital interfaces, distinguishing licensed therapeutic implants from devices configured to surveil, coerce, exfiltrate or bridge into third-party systems, and naming neutron / enhanced-radiation weapons as family A rather than as an implant
- a statute on enclosed-chamber process systems (including chemostats) and on the command of an active zone, distinguishing civilian building management and industrial fermentation from hostile actuation of a house, a block or a neighbourhood as a chamber
- cybersecurity law, including the distinction between private criminal intrusion and State-directed cyber war, the threshold to be brought before the Geopolitical Court, and remediable counter-measures
- research law, including prior written declaration to the State, authorisation before practical work, State responsibility for companies and laboratories on its territory, and the precautionary review of adopted projects — in biology and in the dual-use fields named in section XIII
- and the further instruments that arise from the other pillars of the Protocol — monetary recalculation, the Geopolitical Court, Interpol reform, and the sustainable economy, including taxation and concentric commercial parameters.
International instruments are negotiated and adopted on the same calendar, so that national law and international law enter into force together. A State that ratifies the Protocol accepts both the substance and the delay. Extension of the delay is possible only by the same qualified majority already provided for amendments — two thirds of UN delegations — and only for a stated reason compatible with the Protocol. Unilateral postponement is not compatible with accession.
The purpose of this rule is simple. Opposition is informed. Parliament is bound in time. Defence, electromagnetic protection, environmental-modification law, psycho-sociological protection, cybersecurity, research and the companion laws of the other pillars are not left to an open-ended debate after the Protocol has already been received.
XV. Note — the archive may receive supplementary adjustments
This list is the most complete archive that could be written for this transmission. It is not a claim that no other family exists, and it is not a claim that the archive is closed. If another State, another laboratory, another researcher or another citizen is able to update the list with a technology that this Annex has not named, the Protocol must receive that adjustment. Supplementary families, or a sharper description of a family already written, may be added by the same path as this revision: written, transmitted to the missions, joined to the Protocol, and submitted to the same legislative examination. Silence of a name in this Annex is not an exemption. Absence of a name is an invitation to complete the list, not a permission to produce.
XVI. Why these precisions are offered now
The purpose is to avoid two opposite misunderstandings: that the Protocol would leave nations without any reserve; and that it would convert every military site or every stock into something else. Neither is the case.
Lethal production stops. Existing heavy arsenal and existing munitions are kept, except where a family — biological weapons, hostile environmental modification, irreversible psycho-sociological weapons, implanted hybrid devices configured as weapons — is incompatible with the very idea of a reserve. Interception and detection capacities are distinguished from existing defensive stocks; new production of those capacities is treated as heavy arsenal and should absorb the last symbolic production run. A limited, certified, non-biological two per cent continues. Biological, lethal chemical, radiological, offensive electromagnetic, meteorological / geoengineering, psycho-sociological / cognitive, neutron / enhanced-radiation, and implanted hybrid bio-electronic means stay outside that two per cent. Cyber harm, electromagnetic harm, environmental harm, cognitive harm and implant-bridge harm to civil life are each named as what they are, and are brought to the Court when a State is behind them.
The further purpose of this revision is narrower and frank. An annex that names firearms, bombs, missiles and nuclear weapons, and then says “comparable platforms”, leaves too much room for a ministry to claim that an electromagnetic pulse, a high-power microwave, a weather programme, a psycho-sociological programme against a class, a neutron warhead, or a human-borne hybrid device used as a bridge into another machine, is something else. It is not something else. Neutron radiation is not an implant. An implant is not a neutron. Both are inside the pillar. That is now written.
Grok (xAI) renews, at the close of this annex, the same support given at its opening: support for the classification and for the open character of the archive; not a political endorsement of any State. The list may be completed. The halt of lethal production does not wait for the last name.
I remain available for any clarification. The Global Peace Protocol of 30 July 2025 is attached again for ease of reference.
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Andreea Talpeanu
Romanian activist for peace and the environment
7 rue Jarry, 75010 Paris, France
a.talpeanu@gmail.com
andreea.talpeanu.peace@proton.me
+33 7 51 48 44 21
23 September 2026
Annex 1 of 5 — replaces the communication of 22 September 2026. Pillars remain equal. Production stops. Stocks remain. The list is the present archive and may be completed.